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Abstract: Truth and Justice at the Grassroots: Community Truth Processes in the Southern 
United States 
Truth commissions are implemented in order to "deal with the past" in the context of a 
transition in government from authoritarian to democratic rule. At the center of a truth 
commission is a truth process that attempts to establish the experience of gross human rights 
abuse at the hands of the state, and does so in a way which places the victims of such abuse at the 
center of the process, through valuing victim testimony as "truth." It is done with the assumption 
in mind, that in order for a society, or community, to have healthy relations in the future, violent 
past experiences must be faced and dealt with. Communities at a local level have imitated the 
structure, goals and procedures of truth commissions in projects that have been termed 
"Unofficial Truth Projects." 
This thesis compares three case studies of unofficial truth projects which have taken 
place in the Southern United States in the past few years: The Greensboro Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission in Greensboro, North Carolina, which sought to establish a 
community reconciliation process 25 years after what has come to be known as the "Greensboro 
Massacre"; and two civil-society based truth processes, the Katrina National Justice Commission 
and the International Tribunal on Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, which seek to establish truth and 
gain reparations for human rights abuses which have taken place in the aftermath of Hurricane 
Katrina in New Orleans. The author considers various projects in a comparative manner, and 
through examining their histories, structures and ideological make-up, analyzes the processes in 
terms how these factors affect the ability for the project to: gain legitimacy as a truth process, 
generate resources and support, acknowledge victims' experiences, and engage the community in 
reconciliation efforts. The author also echoes the calls for a shift in paradigm in reconciliation and 
transitional justice literature, which would allow for a space to exist for truth processes that may 
be unofficial and fall outside a context of a formal transition. Such processes could still greatly 
benefit communities living in post-conflict contexts and with histories of racial and political 
violence, such as many communities in the Southern United States. 
Lauren Dollar 
145 Rochester Road 
Observatory, Cape Town, 7925 
laurendoll arCW, gmai 1. com. 
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Introduction 
Truth commissions have recently developed within the past century. They are 
institutions charged with investigating past human rights abuses and atrocities through a 
non-adversarial and non-judicial process that primarily values the testimony of victims. 
Transitional and post-conflict societies establish these special truth-telling institutions in 
order to achieve some measure of justice and accountability in the aftermath of political 
violence and oppression. Beginning with the National Commission on the Disappeared in 
Argentina in 1984, and including the most famous truth commission to date, the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission of 1996-1998, truth commissions have 
become celebrated, but also controversial, tools for "dealing with the past" in post-
conflict and transitional societies. 1 
The development of truth commissions parallels the post-World War II 
development of an international consensus on the importance of holding perpetrators, 
including state officials, accountable for gross human rights violations, crimes against 
humanity and genocide.2 These institutions have become closely associated, ifnot 
directly linked to, the transition in governments from authoritarian rule to democracy. 
This field of study that seeks to understand the ways societies reckon with violent 
political pasts has been termed, transitional justice. 3 
With the example of transitional justice mechanisms in mind, such as truth 
commissions, truth-telling processes about past atrocities have been imitated by local 
communities and civil-society-based groups around the world. This has not been confined 
to post-conflict or transitional societies only; in some cases, similar truth projects take 
place in the context of a country which is not currently undergoing a transition, but which 
concerns atrocities that took place in the distant past (e.g. colonial genocides or slavery) 
and were never faced or acknowledged, or in a context in which no transition, in the 
sense of a regime change, has occurred at all. These truth projects imitate the transitional 
1 Priscilla Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity (New York: Routledge, 
2001). 
2 Geoffery Robertson, Crimes against Humanity: The Struggle/or Global Justice (New York: The New 
Press, 1999). 
3 Neil Kritz, Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes: Country 
Studies (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995). 
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justice models' truth gathering process: in their goals, structure and procedure, in that 
they are particularly concerned with establishing truth surrounding gross human rights 
violations. They may imitate the structure of criminal tribunals, in that they may carry out 
a mock trial; or they may imitate truth commissions by carrying out public victims' 
hearings with a body of commissioners.4 But unlike international tribunals such as the 
Nuremberg Trials or official Truth Commissions such as those in Argentina, Chile or 
South Africa, these efforts typically take place without government sanction, funding or 
support.5 Such efforts have been termed "Unofficial Truth Projects (UTPs).,,6 Such 
projects have taken place around the world in countries such as Brazil, Northern Ireland, 
Zimbabwe, Guatemala and Cambodia. For example, in Brazil, Brazil: Nunca Mas, was a 
truth-telling effort under the auspices of a Catholic Bishop aimed at establishing the truth 
about political torture in Brazil between the period of 1964-1979; and in Northern 
Ireland, the Arondyne Commemoration Project was an effort by community members in 
Arondyne to collect information on 99 members of the Arondyne Community who had 
died as a result of political violence.7 UTPs vary greatly in scope, focus and strategies of 
gathering information. 
This paper will examine UTPs that have taken place recently in the United States. 
Such projects include: the Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 
Greensboro, North Carolina, a project which sought to establish the truth about a 
massacre which took place in the 1970' s in an effort to further community reconciliation, 
and two truth projects centered on the events, human rights abuses and government 
failures during and after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in New Orleans, Louisiana. 
4 The projects examined in this paper have imitated transitional justice models in their structure. The 
Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Katrina National Justice Commission have 
modeled their projects after the structure of truth commissions, whereas the International Tribunal on 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita modeled itself after a tribunal's structure, resulting in a mock trial. 
5 The literature on unofficial truth projects is limited, though some literature exists focused on individual 
projects, such as the Arondyne Commemoration Project of Northern Ireland, the Breaking the Silence 
project in Zimbabwe, Brazil: Nunca Mas!, Uruguay: SERPAJ and the Ka Ho'okolokolonui Kanaka Maoli 
Tribunal in Hawaii, see bibliography. 
For general information on unofficial truth projects, see: Louis Bickford, "Unofficial Truth Projects", 
Human Rights Quarterly 29, no. 4 (2007): 994-1035; Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 21-2. 
6 Bickford, "Unofficial Truth Projects," 994. 
7 Ibid., 1005-1022. 
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In 2005, the first (unofficial) Truth and Reconciliation Commission to be held in 
the United States took place in Greensboro, North Carolina.8 The commission was 
charged with looking into events that took place in 1979, when, at an anti-Klu Klux Klan 
(KKK) rally taking place in a public housing complex, five protesters were killed and 
others injured by armed KKK members. The entire incident was caught on camera by a 
local news station, who had arrived to cover the protest. Although the killings took place 
at the hands of KKK members and neo-Nazi's, there was evidence that there had been 
cooperation with the police department, and the killers were acquitted, despite the 
videotaped evidence, after what appeared to be a mock trial. 9 Almost thirty years later, 
the community of Greensboro, NC decided to revisit the incident in an effort to reveal the 
true turn of events, and to initiate reconciliation of the community. Inspired by the South 
African Truth Commission, an unofficial Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (GTRC) was established on a grassroots level. As part of its mission 
statement, the GTRC posits itself as potential model to be used in other cities in the 
United States, especially in Southern cities with painful pasts and in a climate where 
official truth commissions are unlikely to take place. 10 
On August 29,2005, Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast of the United States, 
causing widespread destruction and chaos. The destruction in the city of New Orleans 
was compounded by a breach in the levee system, which caused one of the biggest floods 
in the history of the United States. Though Hurricane Katrina was a "natural disaster," at 
every level of preparation for and response to the storm, Hurricane Katrina amounted to a 
man-made disaster. At the intersection of poverty and negligence, and some claim 
racism, an entire population of the city had been made vulnerable, forgotten and abused. 11 
The predominately African American victims of Hurricane Katrina experienced 
multiple human rights abuses at the hands of the state, both during the immediate 
8 For information on the Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission see: 
Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, www.greensborotrc.org; Greensboro Truth and 
Community Reconciliation Project, www.gtcro.org; "United States (Greensboro, North Carolina)", 
International Centre for Transitional Justice, http://www.ictj.org/enlwhere/region2/517.html. 
9 Sally Bermanzohn, Through Survivors' Eyes: From the Sixties to the Greensboro Massacre (Nashville: 
Vanderbilt University Press, 2003); Elizabeth Wheaton, Codename Greenkil: The 1979 Greensboro 
Killings (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1986). 
10 Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, www.greensborotrc.org. 
11 Michael Eric Dyson, Come Hell or High Water: Hurricane Katrina and the Color of Disaster (New 
York: Basic Civitas Books, 2006). 
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aftennath of the stonn, and during the months that followed. It is through the actions and 
abuses by people which differentiates the experience of Hurricane Katrina from other 
natural disasters, and which warrants the establishment of transitional justice truth 
processes. The truth processes focus not on the mechanics behind the havoc wreaked by 
the floodwaters, but rather on what actions and inactions of government officials violated 
the human rights of the citizens of New Orleans. Because of the nature of the widespread 
chaos in the aftennath of the stonn, a comprehensive picture of what actually happened 
has not been established. 
Multiple grassroots truth-telling initiatives have taken root to gain a more clear 
understanding of the human rights abuses in the aftennath of Hurricane Katrina. These 
truth-telling efforts differ from the government initiatives, which have focused on 
communication failures and breakdowns and on weaknesses in planning efforts; instead 
they have primarily focused on the experiences by the victims of the stonn. While the 
governmental commissions of enquiry have focused on federal level emergency 
management and have interviewed government agents regarding government failures, 12 
the grassroots initiatives have gathered testimony from those on the ground regarding 
their experiences in regards to: their lack of ability to evacuate, their treatment at the 
hands of police officers and National Guardsmen, abandonment of prisoners in the local 
prison, encounters with vigilante groups, their subsequent struggles in gaining aid, 
amongst other human rights concerns. Such grassroots initiatives include the Katrina 
National Justice Commission,13 a commission staged by a coalition of African American 
churches, and the International Tribunal on Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, a mock trial 
staged by a coalition of both American and non-American liberal social justice 
12 The federal government of the United States has released three major reports on Katrina: 
Department of Homeland Security, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, by 
Frances Fragos Townsend, (Washington DC: 2006), http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-
learned.pdf; 
Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, A 
Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparationfor 
and Response to Hurricane Katrina, HR. Report 109-377, 109th Congress, 2nd Session, by Tom Davis, 
(Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2006), 
http://www .gpoaccess.gov/ serial set! creportslkatrina.html; 
Special Report of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, US Senate, Hurricane 
Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared, S. Report 109-322, 109th Congress, 2nd Session, by Susan Collins, 
(Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2006), 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset!creports/katrinanation.html. 
13 Samuel DeWitt Proctor Conference, Inc., www.sdpc.info. 
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organizations in order to "put the American government on trial" to address the human 
rights abuses during and after the hurricane. 14 
Truth commissions have gained prominence on the world stage as viable and 
effort-worthy endeavors in the current field of transitional justice as a means to address 
human rights abuse, usually in the context of a regime transition. A new development has 
occurred within the United States, however, in which groups of citizens, independent of 
the government, have organized their own community truth processes to address human 
rights abuses, albeit in a non-transitioning context. How have communities in the 
Southern United States (a democratic country with sometimes undemocratic and abusive 
practices) appropriated truth and justice models traditionally invoked by transitioning 
governments on an official level? Moreover, what are the goals and benefits of such 
processes? Where can we locate these efforts of community-truth gathering in the new 
sub-field of transitional justice? 
This thesis will examine the aforementioned unofficial truth processes in a 
comparative manner. I will examine their structure, goals, as well as to what extent these 
unofficial truth projects managed to establish legitimacy and overcome the challenges 
posed by their unofficial status, such as governmental opposition, limited access to 
funding and media, as well as lack of legal powers. I will also explore the benefits to 
holding such processes, albeit being unofficial; as well as exploring the challenges and 
dangers posed by unofficial status. My research focused draws on theory behind truth 
processes, and information regarding the projects, their structure and their reception by 
the community. 15 
Regarding limitations, I will not attempt to come to any conclusions regarding the 
"truth" of either the Greensboro Massacre or Katrina. I also will not be able to come to 
any conclusions regarding the assessment or "success" of the relative projects. Should the 
success, be measured by the attainment of specific goals which the commissions sought 
to achieve? Other more abstract goals have also been mentioned as part of the process, 
such as reconciliation, regaining dignity for victims by listening to victims' voices and 
14 International Tribunal on Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, www.internationaltribunal.org. 
15 As such, many of my references are to newspaper articles. These newspaper articles will be fully 
referenced in the footnotes, and will not be included in the bibliography, in accordance with Chicago 
Manuel of Style, section 17.191. 
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establishing accountability in order to promote a human rights culture. What exactly is 
"reconciliation"? Borer problematizes these concepts: "Two frequent goals of truth 
commissions include the promotion of a human rights culture and the restoration of the 
dignity of victims. How do we know a human rights culture when we see it? How do we 
define human dignity?,,16 The next step in analyzing truth projects is through assessment, 
which is complicated, multi-faceted and requires the passage of time. 
The first chapter of this thesis will focus on the theory behind the truth process 
aspect of truth commissions. I will draw from the vast literature available on truth 
commissions, and apply the relevant similarities and comparative points between official 
truth commissions and unofficial truth projects. My second chapter will focus on the 
Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission. I will explain the complex and 
democratic nature of the process itself, and explore the reported community response to 
the project. In my third chapter, I will focus on the two truth processes that centered on 
the events and abuses of the Katrina. I will also explain the structure of those processes, 
and compare these to the GTRC. Through comparison, better understanding will result, 
of what different types of truth processes entail, and how the structure of the processes 
can add and detract from legitimacy (which is vital to achieving its goals). 
16 Tristan Anne Borer, "Truth Telling as a Peace Building Activity," in Telling the Troths: Troth Telling 
and Peace Building in Post Conflict Societies, ed. Tristan Anne Borer, (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame, 2006) 26. 
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Chapter 1: Truth Processes: Official Truth Commissions and Unofficial Community 
Truth-telling Projects 
A variety of endeavors ranging from scientific research, to criminal prosecutions, 
investigative journalism and the writing of history may all be considered "truth 
processes". Such processes are established in order to establish the "truth" in a variety of 
contexts, with the method of inquiry differing depending on the context. In a world 
fraught with conflict, and with the growing normative emphasis placed on human rights, 
it has become incumbent upon societies to establish a record as to gross human rights 
violations that occur to victims in the context of violence and political atrocities. What is 
more, societies must take this task upon themselves in a way that fosters reconciliation 
and without inciting further conflict. Much has been written on truth commissions in as 
far as comparatively studying their various institutional features, mandated objectives, 
formal powers and actual outcomes. I7 What I am rather concerned with is the type of 
truth process that truth commissions carry out. 18 What are the particular features of the 
truth processes involved in truth commissions that differentiate them from the more 
familiar truth processes such as criminal prosecutions, investigative journalism and 
historical research? 
Truth commissions have typically been used in the transitional context of 
societies emerging from periods of mass human rights abuse, political violence and 
official denial, often as an integral part of democratic transitions from authoritarian rule; 
commissions are government-sanctioned institutions formally mandated to take on the 
role of conducting these truth processes to establish a clear understanding of atrocities 
that have taken place, while valuing victims' testimony as "truth" .19 Significantly, this 
effort of "dealing with the past" is undertaken in a forward-looking manner with hope 
17 Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 32-71. 
18 Juan E. Mendez, "The Human Right to Truth: Lessons Learned from Latin American Experiences with 
Truth Telling," in Telling the Truths: Truth Telling and Peace Building in Post Conflict Societies, ed. 
Tristan Anne Borer (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 2006), 142-3. 
19 For discussion on transitions from authoritarian rule, see: Guillermo O'Donnell, Phillip Schmitter and 
Lawrence Whitehead, ed., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Guillermo O'Donnell, Phillip Schmitter and Lawrence Whitehead, 
ed., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1986). 
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that establishing the truth about past atrocities will aid in establishing a new human rights 
culture. Truth commissions thus represent a distinctive kind of truth process in which the 
society seeks to reestablish a formal moral order, through a concerted attempt to 
understand the underlying causes of conflict and in order to learn how to prevent similar 
occurrences in the future. 2o Oftentimes, the process is undertaken in a spirit of 
reconciliation, in hopes that by establishing an inclusive and authoritative "truth," based 
on the testimony of primary participants and balancing a wide variety of perspectives 
within a common framework, the traumas of past conflicts and atrocities can be 
overcome by starting a process of moving forward as a community. 21 
This kind of truth process has most often been undertaken on an official level by a 
new democratic government establishing a "truth commission" in a context of regime 
change: hence the term "transitional justice." But official truth commissions are not the 
only form of this kind of truth process. Similar truth processes have also occurred in other 
cases, which were not truth commissions, per se. Unofficial truth processes have taken 
place in Brazil (where church groups documented instances of torture and disappearances 
from 1964-1979 in a proj ect entitled Brazil: Nunca Mas!, with the report released in 
1985),22 and in Zimbabwe (where the Catholic church and human rights NGO's 
documented murders and abuse that took place between 1980-1989 in a report entitled 
Breaking the Silence, which was released in 1997)?3 Communities around the world 
have taken on this model of this kind of truth process to address unresolved legacies of 
past atrocities and political violence (especially at the hands of the state) coupled with 
denial, distorted truths, and injustice. 
20 Rajeev Barghava, "Restoring Decency to Barbaric Societies," in Truth v. Justice: the Morality of Truth 
Commissions, ed. Robert Rotberg and Dennis Thompson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000) 53. 
21 Archbishop Desmond Tutu, No Future without Forgiveness, (New York: Random House, 1999). 
22 Lawrence Weschler, A Miracle, A Universe (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press: 1998). 
23 Shari Eppel, " 'Healing the Dead': Exhumation and Reburial as Truth-Telling and Peace-Building 
Activities in Rural Zimbabwe," in Telling the Truths: Truth Telling and Peace Building in Post Conflict 
Societies, ed. Tristan Anne Borer (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 2006) 259-288. 
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Truth Commissions 
The emergence of unofficial truth processes is closely modeled on, and may have 
been a direct result of, the proliferation of truth commissions around the world. The first 
significant truth commission, The National Commission on the Disappeared, took place 
in Argentina in 1984, followed by other Latin American truth commissions, including the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Chile in 1991.24 The South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) began in 1996, and became the most prominent and 
internationally recognized truth commission worldwide. The TRC, with its public 
testimony at victims and other hearings given wide media coverage, soon became the 
model for official truth processes and was emulated in various ways by similar official 
truth commissions in various African, Asian and Latin American countries. 
The example of these truth commissions have inspired and influenced what Louis 
Bickford has termed "Unofficial Truth Projects."(UTPs)25 Louis Bickford defines UTPs 
as: 
(1) ... geared towards revealing the truth about crimes committed in the 
past as a component of a broader strategy of accountability and justice; (2) 
.. .in their effort to do so, they self-consciously or coincidentally resemble 
official truth commissions that have been created in countries as different 
as Chile, Morocco, South Africa, Sierre Leone, and East Timor; but ... (3) 
these particular efforts are rooted in civil society-hosted and driven by 
human rights NGOs, victim groups, universities, and other societal 
organizations-and are not primarily state-based efforts.26 
UTPs arise in a similar context to that of truth commissions, i.e. where the legacies of 
past human rights violations and political atrocities or state crimes are unresolved, 
presenting a manifest need for establishing the "truth" about them, through the voice of 
the victims. Much has been written on truth commissions, spelling out how they can 
benefit post-conflict and/or transitional societies, and why such truth processes are 
24 Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 33,35; Mendez, "The Human Right to Truth," 119-125. 
25 Bickford, Unofficial Truth Projects, 994. 
26 Ibid., 994. 
13 
University of Cape Town
needed in these cases.27 This thesis will draw on some of the literature on truth 
commissions, with a view to illustrating the nature of truth processes relevant to UTPs. 
"Dealing with the Past" (of Human Rights AbuseslPolitical Atrocities/State Crimes) 
The need for this specific kind of truth process in transitional justice contexts 
arises from the historical experience of substantial human rights violations and/or 
political atrocities which had also been publicly denied or officially covered-up, most 
often by a prior regime. It is precisely in so far as the state had failed to protect the human 
rights of citizens, had fostered the public denial of these atrocities instead of 
acknowledging the whole truth, and had failed in upholding the rule oflaw and pursuing 
justice that such truth processes are necessitated in order to "uncover" the 
unacknowledged human rights abuses which have transpired. Arguably, a similar truth 
process may benefit the reconciliation of post-conflict communities existing within 
"stable liberal democracies." In such cases there may still have been human rights abuse 
at the hands of the state and a vitalfailure to acknowledge such abuse. 
It should be stressed that these truth processes seek to identify human rights 
abuses or political atrocities, and not other kinds of suffering or harm, however extensive 
or severe. In the context of Hurricane Katrina, for example, it would not make sense to 
hold Mother Nature morally responsible or legally responsible. Rather, the focus of such 
a truth process would be on what actions, which violated the human rights of others, took 
place at the hands of human perpetrators during and after the storm in order to necessitate 
a ''truth process" in a transitional justice sense. 
It is also important to stress, that these transitional justice truth processes are 
different than ordinary criminal prosecutions. Placed in a context in which the crimes 
committed were by the state itself, (or with state and judicial complicity), complicated 
further with state denial, it is often insufficient to rely on the criminal justice system to 
hold the state agents accountable. The state may not be relied upon to offer self-sanction, 
which is precisely the issue at hand. Truth processes take place to hold those in power 
27 Mark Freeman and Priscilla Hayner, "Truth-Telling," in The International Center for Transitional 
Justice Handbookfor Reconciliation, ed. Mark Freeman and Priscilla Hayner (2003) 122-143. 
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accountable, when they act contrary to the laws and human rights nonns, which the state 
is charged with upholding to begin with. 
Restorative Justice and Reconciliation 
Along with their backwards-looking aims of "dealing with the past" (of human 
rights abuses), the type of truth process involved in both official truth commissions and 
unofficial truth projects typically has the forward-looking objectives of restorative justice 
and reconciliation. Significantly, the South African TRC displayed the banner "Truth, the 
Way to Reconciliation" at all its victims hearings, so indicating that uncovering the truth 
about past atrocities is not meant to rekindle old conflicts but rather to bring about lasting 
reconciliation. Restorative justice has been defined by Jeniffer Llewellyn as "Justice 
focused on the restoration of relationships hanned by the conflicts of the past in order to 
create a foundation for the new society ... restoration of relationships is at the heart of 
justice.,,28 According to Elizabeth Kiss, restorative justice can be defined in tenns of 
three aspects: i) restorative justice seeks to affinn and restore victims' dignities, ii) it 
holds perpetrators accountable (emphasizing the hann they have caused to individual 
human beings), and iii) it seeks to create social conditions in which human rights will be 
respected.29 These are the very features that bind the unofficial truth processes examined 
in this thesis together. 
The restorative nature of these truth processes appears from the special linkage 
between truth and acknowledgment of victims of human rights abuses. The philosopher 
Thomas Nagel points to the important distinction between knowledge and 
acknowledgement.3o In some cases of past human rights abuses, the truth may be 
28 Jeniffer Llewellyn, "Restorative Justice in Transitions and beyond: The Justice Potential of Truth-Telling 
Mechanisms for Post-Peace Accord Societies," in Telling the Truths: Truth Telling and Peace Building in 
Post Conflict Societies, ed. Tristan Anne Borer (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 2006) 88, 100. 
29Kiss, "Moral Ambition Within and Beyond Political Restraints," 79. 
30 Cited by Sanford Levinson, "Trials, Commissions, and Investigating Committees," in Truth v. Justice: 
the Morality of Truth Commissions, ed. Robert Rotberg and Dennis Thompson (princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2000) 221-2; Andre du Toit, "The Moral Foundations of the South African TRC," in 
Truth v. Justice: the Morality of Truth Commissions, ed. Robert Rotberg and Dennis Thompson (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2000) 132; Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 26. 
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unknown so that a delving into what has been hidden, forgotten, or never known is 
required to learn what has happened. This is a matter of knowledge based on factual 
truths, and requires a forensic truth process.31 However in the case of victims of torture, 
rape, detainee abuse, etc, the victims themselves already know of the horrors that have 
taken place, so knowledge is not the aspect of truth missing. What is often missing, 
especially in the contexts where such human rights abuses have been routinely and 
officially denied, is acknowledgement that such abuses have occurred. Accordingly, truth 
commissions approach the issue of establishing the truth from a unique angle, that of 
victims' hearings. Giving victims the option to voice their stories is one way of publicly 
restoring the victims' dignity through affirming their humanity, while acknowledging that 
what was done to them was wrong. In the context of an official truth commission, this 
acknowledgement is implicit in the process. In the community context of an unofficial 
truth process, providing a forum for public testimony by victims may likewise serve as a 
form of acknowledgement by the community, if the process is indeed designed to be 
inclusive and legitimate. The unofficial truth project may also, as a process, include 
demands for acknowledgement of the human rights abuses by the government at a local, 
state or federal level. In that case, the acknowledgement is present from the participants 
and is addressed to those still in positions of power. 
As a particular kind of truth process, such acknowledgement of victims may also 
be regarded as an objective of restorative justice. Central to the argument for restorative 
justice is that in a relevant sense, i.e. that of justice as recognition, justice is achieved 
when victims regain dignity and voice. Fraser argues that "recognition" is a distinct form 
of justice in and of itself, separate from distributive or retributive justice. 32 Andre du Toit 
also makes a similar argument in conceptualizing truth as acknowledgement and justice 
as recognition33• "Justice as recognition entails acknowledging the distinctive identity of 
the other, striving to repair damage done to him or her through violence, stigmatization, 
and disrespect, and including his or her stories in our collective histories," says Elizabeth 
KiSS.
34 This is the reverse of dealing with the past of human rights abuses and communal 
31 Du Toit, "The Moral Foundations of the South African TRC," 132. 
32 Kiss, "Moral Ambition Within and Beyond Political Restraints," 73. 
33 Du Toit, "The Moral Foundations of the South African TRC," 123. 
34 Kiss, "Moral Ambition Within and Beyond Political Restraints," 73. 
16 
University of Cape Town
conflict by "moving on" and trying to forget what has happened. Asking victims to 
forgive and forget the abuses done to them implicitly amounts to confirming that what 
has happened to them doesn't matter, thus compounding their victimization.35 Gathering 
testimony in public victims hearings and drafting a report of the abuses which have 
occurred is one strategy to show the victims that they and their stories do matter. 36 
The absence of official acknowledgement is one of the inherent weaknesses of 
unofficial truth processes compared to official truth commissions.37 Even so, there may 
be some benefit to community recognition, albeit absent of state acknowledgment. Lundy 
and McGovern (researchers who interviewed community members in Arondyne, 
Northern Ireland after the Arondyne Commemoration Project, a community truth-telling 
initiative), report that interviewees in Arondyne felt a sense of justice when their 
experiences and pain were acknowledged by the community: "For many there was a 
sense in which the recognition derived from their involvement in the project was itself a 
(sufficient) form ofjustice.,,38 It is possible that an UTP, provided it can achieve a sense 
of legitimacy and inclusiveness, may serve a similar purpose of restoring dignity to 
victims (albeit not on par with official recognition) by treating their experiences with 
respect, sincerity and community acknowledgement. At the same time this kind of truth 
process and restorative justice may also bring about the conditions for communal 
reconciliati on. 
Another aspect of the truth process itself is the nature of the relationship between 
the process and the testifying victim. The truth process grounded in restorative justice, 
which grants victims the opportunity to voice their stories, is fundamentally different 
from the relationship of testifying victims in the criminal justice context of retributive 
justice. Priscilla Hayner, following Martha Minow, points out that in a trial setting, 
35 Martha Minow, "The Hope for Healing: What Can Truth Commissions Do?" in Truth v. Justice: the 
Morality of Truth Commissions, ed. Robert Rotberg and Dennis Thompson (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2000) 246; Barghava, "Restoring Decency to Barbaric Societies," 52. 
36 One argument for truth commissions is that they are cathartic. For an discussion surrounding the ways in 
which testifying can be therapeutic for victims see, Minow, "The Hope for Healing"; Theresa Godwin 
Phelps, Shattered Voices: Language, Violence and the Work of Truth Commissions, (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004). 
37 Bickford, "Unofficial Truth Projects ", 31. 
38 Patricia Lundy and Mark McGovern, "Community Based Approaches to Post Conflict 'Truth-telling': 
Strengths and Limitations," Shared Space 1 (2005): 44, http://www.community-
relations.org.uklfilestore/ documents/shared -space-issue-l-d -lundy-mcgovern.pdf. 
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victims are only called to testify regarding specific, narrow aspects of a case, and defense 
attorneys often vigorously challenge their testimonies.39 Whereas criminal prosecutions 
are concerned primarily with determining the guilt of individual perpetrators, truth 
commissions (and UTPs) seek to understand the experiences of victims themselves and to 
incorporate their stories into the narrative of the overall experience of the community. 
Fostering a Human Rights Culture 
Both truth commissions and UTPs are born out of the human rights tradition. As 
already noted, truth commissions typically have as their mandate to establish the truth 
regarding specifically defined types of human rights abuses. Thus, the Chilean Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission established the truth about the political disappearances under 
the prior regime,40 whereas the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
limited its scope to "gross human rights violations.,,41 
The UTPs examined in this thesis also belong to this human rights tradition. It is 
human rights abuses that resulted in public outcries within local communities and in calls 
for reparations that gave rise to these unofficial truth projects. The international 
recognition of human rights gives communities a measuring stick by which to judge 
traumatic experiences. Therefore, the violation of human rights can be a norm around 
which a community can find consensus. Elizabeth Kiss points out as the third goal of 
restorative justice as creating social conditions in which human rights are respected.42 
The process of uncovering the truth surrounding abuses that have been covered 
up, and by acknowledging that what happened was wrong, instigates what Jose Zalaquett 
has called "reconstructing the moral underpinnings" of a society.43 These community 
truth-telling processes take upon themselves the responsibility of maintaining a moral 
stance in relation to events that occurred in the community. Bryan Hehir calls for society 
to "pass judgement" on what is heard and "establish a moral account of the historical 
39 Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 28; Minow, "The Hope for Healing," 238. 
40 Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 36. 
41 Ibid., 73. 
42 Kiss, "Moral Ambition Within and Beyond Political Restraints: Reflections on Restorative Justice," 79. 
43 Jose Zalaquett in Truth Commissions: A Comparative Assessment: An Interdisciplinary Discussion Held 
at Harvard Law School in May 1996, ed. Robert Rotberg and Henry Steiner (Cambridge: Harvard Law 
School Human Rights Program, 1997) 16-7. 
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record.,,44 This aspect of the truth process integrates the resistance of a culture of 
impunity,45 with the valuing of the norm of human rights as a measuring stick with which 
to acknowledge wrongs incurred by individuals. 
Connected with this moral regeneration, is the notion that through remembering 
human rights abuses and atrocities that have occurred in the past, relations in the future 
will be bettered, and will possibly prevent similar events from recurring. Inherently, 
according to Rajeev Barghava, remembering wrongs incurred by individuals in a public 
and inclusive forum restores dignity and respect to the victim, as discussed previously. 
Barghava argues that wrongdoing that is not acknowledged will not be forgotten. To the 
contrary, past hurts and slights become ingrained into the collective memory, and these 
scars haunt relations in society in the future. Truth processes allow for a systematic 
working through of remembrance, as opposed to denial or forgetting, of human rights 
abuses. With a truth process as a first step in a community wide effort to work through 
traumatic events, hopefully this cycle of pain will be avoided. He argues, "Only an 
appropriate engagement with the past makes for a livable common future.,,46 He argues, a 
culture of impunity will result in repetition of actions in the future by perpetrators, and 
victims will continue to suffer from degradation and low self-esteem.47 This sentiment is 
echoed in the notion of "Never Again!" Through remembering, lessons will be learned 
and hopefully history will not repeat itself. 
UTPs and Truth Commissions: Similarities 
The unofficial truth projects I will be looking at in this thesis share a number of 
characteristics with the ever-growing number of truth commissions which have taken 
place around the world. Firstly, though not official truth commissions, the Greensboro 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, as well as the National Katrina Justice 
Commission, involved, though in different ways, a group of people working as 
44 Bryan Hehir in Truth Commissions: A Comparative Assessment, ed. Rotberg and Steiner, 24. 
45 Elizabeth Kiss, "Moral Ambition Within and Beyond Political Restraints," 75; Hayner, Unspeakable 
Truths, 29. 
46 Barghava, "Restoring Decency to Barbaric Societies," 53. 
47 Ibid., 53. 
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"commissioners. ,,48 In the case of the International Tribunal on Hurricane Katrina, 
'judges" were appointed.49 The role of these commissioners and judges was to sit through 
the entire process, examine evidence which was presented to the commission, as well as 
to hear the testimonies of victims, and to compile a coherent report of their findings, 
conclusions, and recommendations. The ways in which these commissioners were 
appointed differs significantly in the two cases, and will be explored more in depth in the 
sections pertaining to each individual truth project. 
Secondly, the Greensboro and Katrina UTPs both held public testimony. They 
provided for giving victims (as well as 'perpetrators') the opportunity to tell their story. 
The public testimony aspect in these processes also included expert witnesses testifying; 
though not directly involved as victims or officials, they adduced evidence on various 
aspects to determine forensically what happened. For example, during the National 
Katrina Justice Commission, Senator Hilary Rodham Clinton testified as to the federal 
response of the storm. 50 
Thirdly, the unofficial truth processes ended with the compilation of a final 
written report. The [mal report of these truth processes include the overall narrative 
regarding the events, drawn to the best of the commissioners' ability. The report also 
includes lists of reforms that should be taken, as well as additional recommendations by 
the commission. 
UTPs and Truth Commissions: Dissimilarities 
Most often, truth commissions are established by new democratic governments in 
order to deal with the human rights abuses of the previous authoritarian regime. 
Unofficial truth processes, on the other hand, do not necessarily function in the contexts 
of democratic transitions; they have and can take place in a number of different contexts. 
UTPs can be held in countries in which a transition has taken place a long time ago, for 
example in the post-Jim Crow American South, in countries in which no transition has 
48 Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, www.greensborotrc.org; Iva Caruthers and Bernice 
Powell Jackson, eds., The breach: Bearing Witness, 7, www.sdpc.info. 
49 International Tribunal on Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, www.internationaltribunal.org. 
50 Caruthers, the breach: Bearing Witness, 27. 
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yet taken place, or in a context in which no transition is set to happen but in which 
citizens seek recognition nevertheless for injustices which have occurred in their 
communities, for example in the context of the contemporary United States. In the 
context of this thesis, all three truth projects took place in the United States, in a context 
of no transition. (For example, none of the projects examined in this paper deal with Jim 
Crow era atrocities, from which a transition would have occurred, even if long ago.) 
The implications of legacies of violence are precisely what the unofficial truth 
commissions examined in this paper seek to address. The United States has undergone no 
official dramatic transition. There has been no change of regime relevant to the human 
rights abuses addressed by these UTPs. UTPs may offer a way for citizens to address 
issues in a context in which the lack of a transition means that the government in power 
may be resistant to acknowledging their own actions for a variety of reasons, but where 
they still feel the community at hand could benefit from a truth commission-like process. 
For example, Shari Eppel, writing about the Zimbabwean UTP Breaking the Silence 
writes: 
it was possible for civil society activists and communities to find spaces in 
which they could reclaim the historical truth, heal, and move forward in 
the face of government opposition. It is not necessary for truth-telling and 
peace-building processes to take place only within official post-peace 
accord space. Without official sanction, justice and financial reparation 
cannot be achieved, yet truth can be publicly witnessed and reclaimed, and 
some degree of social reparation can take place. 51 
In other words, communities that have experienced trauma do not need to wait around for 
government approval (especially in the context of government denial) in order to face 
their past as a community and attempt to heal community relations. 
Challenges Faced by Unofficial Truth Projects 
Unofficial truth projects face many challenges. As community-based efforts, 
issues such as publicity, funding, and exposure pose a bigger challenge for unofficial 
truth projects than to their official counterparts. In his paper on unofficial truth projects 
(UTPs), Louis Bickford explores a number of these challenges. Drawing on Bickford's 
51 Eppel, " 'Healing the Dead,' " 286. 
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classification, I will explore the ways in which unofficial truth processes deal with the 
issues of legitimacy, funding, media access and lack of access to official information. 52 
The first issue raised by Bickford is that oflegitimacy. A truth process' legitimacy 
is closely linked to popular perceptions of the enterprise. For example, if the process is 
seen as corrupt or one-sided, then often the results are superfluous. Official truth 
commissions benefit from their official status. Their legitimacy stems from the power of 
the state behind them, as well as the professionalism, seriousness and perceived 
objectivity.53 Levinson also touches on this issue of "authority." The authority granted to 
fmdings by the public, according to Levinson, is a function of the general status of the 
people who are on the commission. Therefore, official commissions almost ipso facto 
retain more authority. 54 
Unofficial truth projects have a harder time gaining the status, recognition and 
consequent legitimacy that may come easier to official truth commissions, though a 
possibility does exist that with the correct structure, methodologies and participation of 
the community an UTP may gain a significant amount of legitimacy. Bickford 
emphasizes the qualities of professionalism and objectivity as two factors that determine 
the legitimacy of a UTP, and points out that at both levels of official truth commissions 
and unofficial truth projects, as far as legitimacy is concerned, a wide-range exists 
(although official truth commissions retain advantages discussed previously).55 The 
identity of the commissioners, and the perceived combination of the ideologies of those 
commissioners, can also affect the perceived objectivity and legitimacy of a 
commission.56 Another important factor regarding to legitimacy is the issue of inclusion, 
that members of all sides of a conflict are included and their perspectives respected, an 
issue that is heavily stressed by the Lundy and McGovern article. It is the fact that all 
sides of the story are included in the reconstruction of the truth that adds to the legitimacy 
(vis-ii-vis the perceived "objectivity") of the project.57 A community-based truth project 
may be able to achieve legitimacy if approached in an appropriate manner. 
52 Bickford, "Unofficial Truth Projects," 29. 
53 Ibid., 29. 
54 Levinson, "Trials, Commissions, and Investigating Committees," 221. 
55 Bickford, "Unofficial Truth Projects," 30. 
56 Levinson, "Trials, Commissions, and Investigating Committees," 223. 
57 Lundy and McGovern, "Community Based Approaches to Post-Conflict 'Truth-Telling' ," 43. 
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It is also possible that within certain contexts an UTP may retain more legitimacy 
than an official effort. Bickford points out that if a government is perceived by the 
population to be insincere and subjective in its truth commission efforts, because there 
appears to be little political will power, or perpetrators remain in control of the 
government, benefit could be found in community control of a truth project. 58 
The second challenge discussed by Bickford is that of access to resources. 
Official truth commissions have an advantage in terms of access to resources: fiscal, legal 
as well as visibility. 59 The project is deemed legitimate and worthwhile to pursue, and the 
state can allocate state funds in order to carry out the commission. Conversely, in the case 
of an UTP, the civil society groups engaged in the project must independently raise the 
money somehow. 
Access to resources is not only a matter of financial resources, but also includes 
access to the media. A government has a large platform, which Bickford terms the "bully 
pulpit," with which to publicize their project.60 They have easy access to media outlets 
with which to have the endeavor publicized. The official status of the enterprise also adds 
to the legitimacy, which may attract more media coverage. However, UTPs must garner 
that attention. Because the effort may not be deemed worthwhile, too small, too 
illegitimate, or "politically unpalatable," the process may have difficulty drawing media 
attention, especially mainstream media attention. In some cases, the government can even 
oppose the happenings and make it even more difficult for the process to gain attention. 
For example, when a state remains in control that maintains a charade of denial regarding 
abuses that the UTP attempts to expose, media attention may be compromised. This 
particular problem is exacerbated when the state retains significant control over the 
media, for example in the context of Zimbabwe.61 
One obvious drawback to unofficial truth processes is their relative lack of legal 
power, or ability to enforce reforms and recommendations. This disadvantage is 
acknowledged by both the Greensboro TRC, as well as both Katrina projects. Among the 
legal powers lacked by unofficial commissions are: the ability to access official 
58 Bickford, "Unofficial Truth Projects," 29. 
59 Ibid., 31. 
60 Ibid., 31. 
61 Eppel, " 'Healing the Dead,' " 261. 
23 
University of Cape Town
It is also possible that within certain contexts an UTP may retain more legitimacy 
than an official effort. Bickford points out that if a government is perceived by the 
popUlation to be insincere and sUbjective in its truth commission efforts, because there 
appears to be little political will power, or perpetrators remain in control of the 
government, benefit could be found in community control of a truth project. 58 
The second challenge discussed by Bickford is that of access to resources. 
Official truth commissions have an advantage in terms of access to resources: fiscal, legal 
as well as visibility.59 The project is deemed legitimate and worthwhile to pursue, and the 
state can allocate state funds in order to carry out the commission. Conversely, in the case 
of an UTP, the civil society groups engaged in the project must independently raise the 
money somehow. 
Access to resources is not only a matter of fmancial resources, but also includes 
access to the media. A government has a large platform, which Bickford terms the "bully 
pulpit," with which to publicize their project.60 They have easy access to media outlets 
with which to have the endeavor publicized. The official status of the enterprise also adds 
to the legitimacy, which may attract more media coverage. However, UTPs must garner 
that attention. Because the effort may not be deemed worthwhile, too small, too 
illegitimate, or "politically unpalatable," the process may have difficulty drawing media 
attention, especially mainstream media attention. In some cases, the government can even 
oppose the happenings and make it even more difficult for the process to gain attention. 
For example, when a state remains in control that maintains a charade of denial regarding 
abuses that the UTP attempts to expose, media attention may be compromised. This 
particular problem is exacerbated when the state retains significant control over the 
media, for example in the context of Zimbabwe.61 
One obvious drawback to unofficial truth processes is their relative lack of legal 
power, or ability to enforce reforms and recommendations. This disadvantage is 
acknowledged by both the Greensboro TRC, as well as both Katrina projects. Among the 
legal powers lacked by unofficial commissions are: the ability to access official 
58 Bickford, "Unofficial Truth Projects," 29. 
59 Ibid., 31. 
60 Ibid., 31. 
61 Eppel, " 'Healing the Dead,' " 261. 
23 
University of Cape Town
government records, the ability to issue subpoenas, the ability to carry out official 
investigations (with all the latest in forensic technology), the ability to offer amnesty (if 
such a move is desired), the ability to offer official reform recommendations, the ability 
to officially name names for reparations programs, and the ability for them to have 
official enforcement or oversight of enforcement of recommendations and reparations 
programs. These limitations severely limit the role that an unofficial truth commission 
can to play.62 
Benefits to Unofficial Processes 
Despite the challenges faced by unofficial truth processes, there is still value that 
may be found in community control over a truth process. Findings by Lundy and 
McGovern in the context of the Arondyne Commemoration Project, as well as 
conclusions made by Shari Eppel in regards to the Zimbabwean Breaking the Silence 
project, confirm that positive results occurred through the community process. The 
benefits found in community level truth-telling may be found in: the community control 
over the methods and scope of the project, issues of trust, flexibility regarding when a 
project can be held (for example, it does not have to be politically agreeable with the 
government), and there can be community involvement and ownership at all levels. 
A primary benefit in community level truth processes is community control over 
how the truth process is carried out. The converse of this is for a truth process to be 
carried out from a higher level: one that conflicts with the general consensus within the 
community itself insofar as what they deem appropriate and helpful for their population. 
Lundy and McGovern pose the question: 
The key question is, how can mechanisms of transitional justice and 'truth-
telling' be framed in order to avoid ['second order traumatisation'] and ensure, in 
more general terms, that real political engagement and agency is not denied to a 
population that has been subject to years of violent conflict? It is in the context of 
such questions that an analysis of the possible role of community-based truth-
telling should be placed.63 
62 Lundy and McGovern, "Community Based Approaches to Post Conflict 'Truth-telling'," 48; Bickford, 
"Unofficial Truth Projects," 32. 
63 Lundy and McGovern, "Community Based Approaches to Post Conflict 'Truth-telling'," 38. 
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Community-based truth-telling places community members in the driver's seat of the 
process. Lundy and McGovern define community-based truth-telling as a process, "in 
which decision-making over the design, remit, conduct, character and outcomes of the 
'truth-telling' process is organized in, with and by members of a given community 
itself.,,64 One of the issues which arose out of the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
process was that some of the victim's felt that the stress placed on reconciliation did not 
fall in line with what they were feeling in regards to how to deal with the past. 65 Eppel, in 
discussions surrounding the Zimbabwean truth process Breaking the Silence, suggests 
that this proactive aspect of the truth process may contribute to democratic participation 
in the future: "It may even be the case that involving communities in experiences that 
empowered them to claim certain rights and create "positive peace" at a very local level 
has increased the likelihood of those communities taking part proactively in democratic 
processes at the nationallevel.,,66 
Lundy and McGovern found that what was often emphasized by community 
members was that the locality of the commission and the presence of "insiders" who were 
"respected and rooted in the community,,,67 as those who were conducting the 
commission, aided in the levels of trust and access which the commission was privy to.68 
UTPs also have the flexibility to take place at the point at which a community 
feels it incumbent to take part in such a process-the community does not need to wait 
for government sanction. This point is particularly pertinent in regards to the UTPs 
examined in this paper: the GTRC was opposed by local government, and the Katrina 
projects focus on contemporary and ongoing human rights abuses, facing the same 
government in power which committed the abuses to begin with. Eppel points out that 
even though a government may oppose the process, communities can still take strides in 
their own right to take steps towards social reparation through a truth process.69 
64 Ibid., 38. 
65 For a critique of the TRC from a psychoanalytic perspective see, Hayes, Graham, "We Suffer our 
Memories," American Imago 55 (1998): 29-50. 
66 Eppel, " 'Healing the Dead,' "263. 
67 Lundy and McGovern, "Community Based Approaches to Post Conflict 'Truth-Telling," 44. 
68 Ibid., 38. 
69 Eppel, " 'Healing the Dead,' " 286. 
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Chapter 2: The Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission: A Potential 
Model for US Communities 
2.1 Introduction: The Greensboro Massacre 
Greensboro, North Carolina is a city of approximately 245,000 people located in 
the American South.7o The city is approximately 55% white and 38% black.7! Greensboro 
was segregated under Jim Crow segregation laws until 1965.72 Greensboro holds a place 
in the history of the Civil Rights Movement, for it is in Greensboro where student sit-ins 
at lunch counters began in order to protest segregation. Four black college students of 
North Carolina A&T University staged the first sit-in on February 1, 1960 at an all-
whites Woolworths lunch counter. Sit-ins occurred across the South in imitation of the 
Greensboro students, and this movement eventually led to the integration ofWoolworths 
stores, as well as other chains.73 It is within this context of racial divides and a history of 
the struggle for civil rights that the following events took place. 
In Greensboro, North Carolina on November 3,1979, Klu Klux Klan (KKK, a 
white supremacist group) members74 and neo-Nazis approached a group of labor rights 
activists, organized by the Communist Workers Party, who were assembling in an all-
black housing project called Morningside to participate in an anti-KKK rally. A shootout, 
initiated by the KKK, took place. 5 protesters were killed and 10 other people wounded. 
The incidence became to be known as the "Greensboro Massacre.,,75 
At the time of the massacre, the white community reacted by placing blame on 
those killed in the massacre as radical instigators, instead of as victims. For example, 
headlines in the Greensboro News and Record read: "Leftists Plan War on Klan,"(Nov. 6, 
70 "Greensboro, North Carolina," Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greensboro,_North_Carolina. 
71 "Greensboro, North Carolina," Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greensboro,_North_Carolina. 
n "Jim Crow Laws," Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jim_Crow_laws. 
73 "Greensboro, North Carolina," Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greensboro,_North_Carolina. 
74 "Klu Klux Klan," Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilKu_Klux_Klan. 
75 Sally Bermanzohn, Through Survivors' Eyes: From the Sixties to the Greensboro Massacre, (Nashville, 
TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2003); Elizabeth Wheaton, Codename Greenkil.· The 1979 Greensboro 
Killings, (Athens: University ofGa, 1986). 
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1979) and" 'They All Hate Each Other,' Professor says of Leftists," (Nov. 6, 1979).76 On 
the other hand, the black community published articles in the Carolina Peacemaker of a 
different tone altogether: "The Morningside Massacre," (Nov. 10, 1979) and "CORE 
Points to Officials for Murders." (Nov. 10, 1979) From the media evidence, it is clear that 
polarization of the community was an immediate result of the incident. 
N ext to the role of the KKK, the complicity of local authorities, in particular of 
the police, became a focal point of tension in determining accountability for the 
massacre. No police were present at the location of the march, even though they had 
made an implicit commitment to provide protection by virtue of issuing the protesters a 
permit. According to the Greensboro Justice Fund, the anti-Klan demonstration's leader, 
Nelson Johnson, had been promised that the police would meet him at the specified 
location at 10 am.77 The police department had an informer, Eddie Dawson, working 
inside the KKK who knew of the plans for the attack, and tipped the police off about the 
plot. The police also procured Dawson with a copy of the parade permit, with full 
knowledge that Dawson was a Klansman. The police decided to not show up, and instead 
took an early lunch.78 Navigating a thin line between complicity in the attack and 
negligence, the police significantly contributed to the fatal outcome of the clash between 
the two groups. Nor did the state subsequently act effectively to holding the perpetrators 
of the massacre accountable for their crime. News cameras captured the clash between 
the two groups, providing clear evidence of who committed the murders. Nevertheless, in 
two criminal trials, one state in 1980 and one federal in 1984, those who had been seen to 
be involved in the murders were acquitted.79 
Subsequent to these abortive criminal trials, the widowed, injured and jailed 
protesters sued some of those involved, including KKK and Nazi members, police 
officers and officials of the FBI, as well as the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms 
(for prior knowledge of the impending attack), in a civil case for damages for violations 
76 Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report (2005), www.greensborotrc.org, 325. 
77 Paul Bermanzohn and Marty Nathan, "Justice and the Greensboro Massacre," Greensboro Justice Fund. 
http://www .gjf.org/index. php ?page=histbro. 
78 Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final Report, Executive Summary, 7-12. 
79 Paul Bermanzohn and Marty Nathan, "Justice and the Greensboro Massacre," Greensboro Justice Fund, 
http://www .gj f.orglindex. php ?page=histbro. 
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of civil rights, wrongful death and assault in 1985. This trial came to be known as the 
Greensboro Civil Rights Suit. The plaintiffs were awarded $350,000.80 
The legacy of the massacre continued to haunt community members, such as the 
surviving protestors, children and widows of those killed, and members of the 
Morningside Homes community (the public housing complex where the incidence took 
place), along with a general ethos of fear and mistrust amongst the community-at-Iarge. 
Some felt that the incident, and the way in which it was handled by the courts and media, 
caused cleavages in the community, especially along racial lines. For example, the 
differing interpretations of the story caused the protesters involved in the incident to be 
ostracized as communists and instigators, when in fact they primarily had been the 
victims. Black community members retained feelings of terror regarding the incident and 
felt victimized, whereas in the white community, a more apologetic stance towards the 
incidence existed.8) During observances marking the massacre's 20th anniversary in 1999, 
survivors of the massacre began to discuss the idea of bringing a truth and reconciliation 
process to the community of Greensboro. 82 
This chapter will explore the history of the Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (GTRC) as an unofficial truth process. The GTRC was part of a complex set 
of developments which involved a range of different agencies, including the plaintiffs in 
the Greensboro Civil Rights Suit, the Greensboro Justice Fund, the Beloved Community 
Center, the International Center for Transitional Justice (lCTJ), The Greensboro Truth 
and Community Reconciliation Project, a National Advisory Committee, a Local Task 
Force (LTF) and a Selection Panel for the Commission. This chapter will consider the 
process involved in building the Commission, the way in which the Commission was 
received by the Greensboro community at-large, how the Commission overcame 
challenges such as securing funding and media coverage, and how it dealt with the issues 
of its own legitimacy and the need to provide "acknowledgement" to victims from an 
unofficial platform. It will also describe relevant activities which have taken place 
subsequently to the Commission continuing the process of reconciliation initiated by the 
GTRC. 
80 Ibid., 1. 
81 Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report, 340-365. 
82 Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report, Annex: Timeline, 200. 
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2.2 The Making of the Greensboro Commission as an Unofficial Truth Process 
2.2.1 The Origins of the Greensboro Truth and Community Reconciliation Project 
(GTCRP) 
Viewed in retrospect, the Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(GTRC) can be reconstructed as a complex process, that started with the plaintiffs in the 
Greensboro Civil Rights Suit and then involved a range of community and other 
agencies, which resulted in the selection and appointment of the Commission. The 
plaintiffs from the Greensboro Civil Rights Suit decided to use some of the money 
together, $75,000 to be exact, towards a fund to memorialize those who were killed in the 
massacre, by giving to social justice organizations in their honor. The fund was named 
the Greensboro Justice Fund and was established in 1987. The fund has grown since and 
gives grants to groups fighting against racism, bigotry and economic injustice in the 
American South.83 
At this early stage of the process, a significant part was played by the Beloved 
Community Center, founded by Reverend Nelson Johnson, a survivor of the massacre 
and a pastor of the Faith Community Church, and his wife Joyce Johnson. The center is 
aimed at providing space for open dialogue and actively promotes issues such as to 
"promote universal housing, economic justice, improved public education and world 
peace.,,84 Reverend Johnson was a leader of the Worker's Viewpoint Organization, the 
group that organized the protest at which the massacre occurred. He was a survivor of the 
massacre, having been stabbed during the attack. 85 
As both organizations were run by survivors of the massacre and long-time 
political allies, the Greensboro Justice Fund and the Beloved Community Center 
collaborated together in order to apply for a grant from the Angus Family Fund to 
forward their idea for a project. The title of the proposal was "Proposal/or a Truth and 
83 Paul Bermanzohn and Marty Nathan, "Justice and the Greensboro Massacre," Greensboro Justice Fund, 
http://www .gj f.org/index. php ?page=histbro. 
84 Beloved Community Center, www.belovedcommunitycenter.org. 
85 Sally Avery Bermanzohn" "A Massacre Survivor Reflects on the Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission," Radical History Review 97 (2007): 104. 
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Reconciliation Process in Greensboro, NC: Forging Community while seeking truth and 
reconciliation related to the November 3, 1979 incident".86 Funding was granted to the 
project: enough to appoint some staff as well as to create a partnership with the New 
York-based International Center for Transitional Justice (lCTJ).87 The granting of the 
funds led to the establishment of the Greensboro Truth and Community Reconciliation 
Project (GTCRP). Thus began the concrete process of constructing a grassroots, 
community-oriented truth-telling process. 
In order to achieve a community-wide unofficial truth process in an inclusive 
way, the GTCRP had to overcome daunting obstacles and challenges. As a community, 
Greensboro had a deeply embedded history of division and conflict between racial groups 
in which the 1979 Greensboro Massacre represented one of the more traumatic and 
potentially divisive moments. Community reconciliation was further jeopardized by the 
political community of Greensboro, such as the Mayor and City Council, who rejected 
the GTRC altogether, neither to support the process or to take the final recommendations 
made by the Commission seriously. The fact that the project was closely associated with 
the victims of the 1979 Massacre also meant that the project would face the challenge of 
defending objectives and legitimacy. How did the GTRCP proceed in their context in 
order to best face these challenges in order to establish the GTRC in the most balanced, 
seemingly legitimate and inclusive way? 
2.2.2 From the National Advisory Committee to the Commission Selection Panel 
The first step taken by the GTCRP on the advice of Lisa Magarell of the ICTJ, 
was the establishment of a National Advisory Committee, in order to build national and 
international support for the process. 88 Members of the National Advisory Committee 
included: Dr. Vincent Harding (the first director of the Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for 
Nonviolent Social Change), Dr. Peter Storey, (former chairperson of the South African 
Council of Churches), and Cynthia Nance (former professor oflaw at the University of 
86 Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report, 200-1. 
87 Ibid., 201. 
88 "National Advisory Committee," Greensboro Truth and Community Reconciliation Project, 
http://www.gtcrp.org/nac.php. 
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Arkansas.)89 These individuals were associated with prestigious organizations and 
removal from the local context. 
The National Advisory Committee in its turn then appointed a Local Task Force 
(LTF). Appointees to the LTF represented a broad base of citizens including clergy, 
professors, judges, students and community activists. A former mayor of Greensboro, 
Carolyn Allen, a retired Presbyterian pastor, Reverend Z Holler, and a Baptist pastor, 
Reverend Gregory Headen, led the LTF.9o The objective of the LTF was to broaden 
citizen support for the project, as well as to prepare the way in which commissioners of 
the GTRC would be selected. A former mayor of Greensboro, Carolyn Allen, Reverend Z 
Holler, a retired Presbyterian pastor, and Reverend Gregory Headen, a Baptist pastor, led 
the LTF.91 
The Local Task Force, in conjunction with the National Advisory Committee 
drafted the mandate of the commission, as well as decided upon how commissioners 
would be subsequently selected, in a process that became known as the "Selection 
Process.,,92 Once the drafting and publication of the mandate had been completed, the 
GTCRP separated itself from the process.93 The goal was that the Commission itself be 
as independent and objective as possible. The GTCRP did participate in nominating a 
member to serve on the Selection Panel, which will be discussed subsequently. 
The mandate set out the objectives of the Commission. It opened with the 
statement, "There comes a time in the life of every community when it must look humbly 
and seriously into its past in order to provide the best possible foundation for moving into 
a future based on healing and hope. Many residents of Greensboro believe that for this 
city, the time is now. ,,94 The "past" with which the Commission was concerned was the 
events surrounding the Greensboro Massacre of 1979 and the subsequent criminal trials, 
89 Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report, 20l. 
90 Ibid., 20l. 
91 Ibid., 201; "National Advisory Committee," Greensboro Truth and Community Reconciliation Project, 
http://www.gtcrp.org/nac.php. 
92 Ibid., 201-2. 
93 Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Mandate for the Greensboro Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (2003), 3. 
94 Ibid., 1. 
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in an effort to establish the truth in a framework of community reconciliation.95 The goals 
of the commission according to the mandate thus included: 
a) Healing and reconciliation of the community through discovering 
and disseminating the truth of what happened [in reference to the 
Greensboro Massacre and surrounding criminal trials] and its 
consequences in the lives of individuals and institutions, both 
locally and beyond Greensboro. 
b) Clarifying the confusion and reconciling the fragmentation that has 
been caused by these events and their aftermath, in part by 
educating the public through its findings. 
c) Acknowledging and recognizing people's feelings, including 
feelings of loss, guilt, shame, anger and fear. 
d) Helping facilitate changes in social consciousness and in the 
institutions that were consciously or unconsciously complicit in 
these events, thus aiding in the prevention of similar events in the 
future. 96 
The mandate also indicated the ways in which the commission would push forward, 
emphasizing the intention of having the process be as public and transparent as 
possible.97 Significantly, the mandate called for the Commission to not only look into the 
direct events, and accountability thereof, which took place on the day of November 3, 
1979, but also to explore the "root causes and historical context" of that event.98 
The terms and objectives of the mandate clearly reflect the direct influence of 
theories of "restorative justice" and the belief that "dealing with the past" will lead to 
healing and reconciliation of the community. One can also see the direct influence of the 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission: the mandate directly quotes the 
TRC's motto ''''Without Truth, no Healing; without Forgiveness, no Future." The 
language in the mandate directly reflects assumptions made by those who advocate for 
truth-seeking based reconciliation: that revealing the truth will implicitly lead to healing, 
as well as prevent similar events from happening again. The direct influence of the TRC 
on the GTRC can be seen through the direct involvement of South African TRC 
commissioners in the GTRC. Archbishop Tutu drafted a letter of support, which the 
GTRC displays proudly on their website, as well as travelled twice to Greensboro to meet 
95 lbid.,I. 
96 Ibid., 1. 
97 Ibid., 1. 
98 Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report: Annex; Timeline, 202. 
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with Commissioners during the course of the process. In addition, a South African 
minister, Reverend Bongani Finca, a commissioner for the South African TRC, also 
presided over the opening public hearings for the GTRC.99 
2.2.3 The Selection Process: Legitimizing the Commission 
The "Selection Process," as designed by the National Advisory Committee and 
the Local Task force, was a complex procedure involving different sets of agencies at 
different stages leading to the actual establishment of the Commission. The main purpose 
was to draft a selection process that would result in the most "democratic and 
community-wide initiative possible."loo Implicitly this recognized the special challenge 
of legitimacy facing an unofficial truth process in the local community context. Even in 
the case of official truth commissions, such as the TRC, it has been stressed that the 
strength of the process was closely bound up with its demonstrably "public and 
democratic" nature. 101 The designers of the GTRC process evidently set out with the need 
very much in mind that only if the selection process itself was demonstratively inclusive 
would it be possible to arrive at a Commission with any hope of public legitimacy in the 
community. Accordingly, they adopted a two-stage strategy. The fIrst stage involved 
having a range of community groups each nominate a person to serve on the Selection 
Panel for the Commission itself. Fourteen community groups were invited to nominate 
representatives on the Selection Panel. These groups included: student bodies, the 
Chamber of Commerce, chancellors and presidents of the six major colleges and 
universities of Greensboro, the Council of Community Organizations, the Greensboro 
Police Officers Association, the Greensboro Truth and Community Reconciliation Project 
(GTCRP), the Guilford County Democratic Party, the Guilford County Republican Party, 
the Mayor of Greensboro, the NAACP, the National Conference for Community and 
Justice (NCCJ), the Jewish community, the Muslim community, the Pulpit Forum / 
African American Churches, the Sons of Confederate Veterans and the Daughters of the 
99 Susan Grego, "Greensboro Truth Commission to Hold Public Hearing July 15-6," International Center 
for Transitional Justice, www.ictj.org. 
100 Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Selection Process, (2003). 
101 Du Toit, "The Moral Foundations of the South African TRC," 129. 
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Confederacy, the traditional Protestant, Catholic, and Independent churches, and the 
Triad Central Labor Council. 102 
There was a broadly based and significant community response to these 
invitations. Of the groups that were invited to nominate a member for the Selection 
Committee, no less than 14 out of the 17 groups did nominate a representative on the 
Selection Panel. However, the Greensboro Police Department, the Sons of Confederate 
Veterans and the Daughters of the Confederacy, and the Chamber of Commerce did not 
nominate anyone to sit on the panel.I03 Significantly, the decline of the invitation to 
participate from these particular groups did limit the extent to which the entire 
community could own a piece of the process. The refusal to participate from the Police 
Department carried interesting implications in particular light of the events that were to 
be investigated by the Commission, considering that the absence of the Police 
Department was implied as the primary cause of the outbreak of violence on the day of 
the massacre. Despite the aforementioned groups abstaining from participating, the 
general response had been sufficient for the selection process to proceed. Lisa Magarell, 
of the lCTJ, met with the Selection Panel to give them a background orientation.104 Judge 
Lawrence McSwain, the nominee from the Mayor's office, was elected by the Selection 
Panel as the Chairperson. 105 
Once the Selection Panel was assembled, the second stage of the Selection 
Process, that involving the actual nominations for the Commission itself, could proceed. 
The Mandate for the GTRC and the procedures for nomination, as well as an explanation 
of how the entire Selection Process was structured, were published in three local 
newspapers (The Greensboro News and Record, The Carolina Peacemaker and the 
Rhinoceros Times). Community members in the Greater Greensboro area were publicly 
invited to nominate people, with a one-page motivation, to serve as commissioners on the 
102 Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Selection Process, (2003). 
103 Bermanzohn, "A Massacre Survivor Reflects", 105 
104 "Selection Panel," Greensboro Truth and Community Reconciliation Project, 
http://www.gtcrp.org/panel.php. 
105 Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Selection Process, (2003). 
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GTRC. I06 After receiving 67 nominations, the Selection Panel set to work to choose 
seven commissioners from diverse backgrounds. Nominees were requested to complete 
an application form, and the Selection Panel interviewed a short-listed group of potential 
commissioners. The Selection Panel's deliberations were not public, but transparency 
was encouraged by asking the Panel members to write out lessons they learned as well as 
how the process was carried out, which would then be made accessible to the public. 
Commissioners were chosen by consensus, and if need be vote, though two-thirds of a 
vote was required to gain a position as commissioner. 
The seven commissioners were chosen and announced on May 27,2004. The 
Commissioners were: Cynthia Brown, a grassroots organizer and leader, former city 
councilwoman and one-time candidate for the U.S. Senate from Durham, NC; Patricia 
Clark, from upstate New York, executive director of the Fellowship of Reconciliation; 
Muktha Jost, an assistant professor in the School of Education at N.C. A & T University 
from Greensboro; Angela Lawrence, a community activist from Greensboro with a long 
history in education and neighborhood development; Robert Peters, a retired corporate 
attorney with experience in dispute resolution from Greensboro; Reverend Mark Sills, 
from Randleman, NC, the executive director of Greensboro's Faith Action International 
House; and Barbara Walker, a retired manager with Wrangler Corps, and former board 
president of the YWCA from Greensboro. 107 Commissioners were chosen based on 
"recognized integrity, [and] a demonstrated commitment to the values of truth, 
reconciliation, equity and justice.,,108 The GTRCP noted that, "Racial, socio-economic, 
religious, and sexual diversity were given strong consideration in the selection of the 
commissioners."I09 The commission included three African American women, two white 
men, one white woman and a woman from India. Five were local residents of 
106Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report, Annex, Timeline, 202; Greensboro 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Selection Process, (2003). 
107Joya Wesley, "For Immediate Release: Selection Panel names Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissioners," International Center for Transitional Justice, 27 May 2004, 
www.ictj.orgieninewipressireleasei470.html. 
108 Greensboro Truth and Community Reconciliation Project, www.gtcrp.org. 
109 Greensboro Truth and Community Reconciliation Project, Selection Process(2003). 
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Greensboro, one came from another city in North Carolina, Durham, and one 
commissioner came from upstate New York. 110 
The Commissioners were sworn in on June 12, 2004 by District Court Judge 
Lawrence McSwain. The ceremony took place at Greensboro's historic Depot. An 
audience of 500 people were in attendance. III The oath sworn by the Commissioners read 
as follows: "Fully aware of the significance and the potential for good in this historic 
undertaking, I pledge my very best effort to the people of Greensboro, North Carolina, 
and the nation, so help me God.,,1l2 
2.2.4 The Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
Once the Commissioners had been sworn in, the formal GTRC process began. 
Necessary administrative tasks were undertaken, such as securing office space and a 
financial officer. The Commissioners also finalized and published their Guiding 
Principles including some additional principles agreed upon by the commissioners. The 
Guiding Principles reaffirmed that the Commissioners would act as an independent body, 
reject no testimony, and act in the spirit of restorative justice and not retributive justice 
(in that no recrimination will be sought). 113 With the Guiding Principles, the 
Commissioners thus explicitly set the GTRC as a truth process within the ambit of 
restorative justice. 
In terms of its mandate, the GTRC had a period of two years within which to 
carry out deliberations and draft the final report. The Commission announced that it 
would begin to collect statements on January 25, 2005 from anyone willing to offer a 
ttO Bermanzohn, "A Massacre Survivor Reflects," 105. 
ttt Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Final Report, Annex, Timeline, 204. 
tt2 "Greensboro to Re-Examine 1979 KKK-Related Deaths" [audiorecording], All Things Considered, 
National Public Radio, 13 June 2004, www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=19S6883. 
tt3 Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Guiding Principles, www.greensborotrc.org. 
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statement who were community members of Greensboro who had any information 
surrounding the events of November 3, 1979.114 
The first round of public hearings took place on July 15-16, 2005 at the Guilford 
County School System's Weaver Education Center. The first public hearings bore the 
title "What brought us to November 3, 1979?" The second round of hearings took place 
on August 26-27, 2005 at an auditorium of North Carolina A & T State University. This 
round of public hearings was entitled "What Happened, On and After, November 3, 
1979?" At these hearings, 16 people were given the opportunity to testify. Those in the 
lineup of testifiers included a police officer who was present at the scene of the massacre, 
the widow of one of the men killed, residents of the housing development where the 
massacre took place, survivors of the massacre (including Reverend Nelson Johnson, 
who survived being stabbed), as well as the judge who presided over the state murder 
trial, and defense attorneys as well as the civil rights attorney who served as lead counsel 
for the plaintiffs in the federal civil trial. 115 Such a diverse lineup oftestifiers allowed the 
Commission, and the public, to hear accounts of the events from a variety of 
perspectives. 
The third round of hearings took place on September 30-0ctober 1,2005. The 
title of these sessions was: "What does the Past have to do with the Present and Future?" 
It took place at an auditorium of the University of North Carolina at Greensboro.116 22 
people gave testimony at the fmal hearings. 117 Testifiers at this round of events spoke to 
clarifying why it is important to carry out the truth process to being with, through 
illustrating how events in the past influence present relations. Through illustrating this, 
the testimonies offered some perspective regarding how to work towards reconciliation. 
114 Jill Williams, "For Immediate Release: Truth and Reconciliation Commission Begins Taking 
Statements," International Center for Transitional Justice, 25 Jan 2005, 
www.ictj.org/enlnews/press/release/281.html. 
115 Joya Wesley, "Truth Commission: Victims, Police and Others to Speak at Hearing," International 
Center for Transitional Justice, 25 Aug 2005, www.ictj.org/enlnews/press/release/469.html. 
116 Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report, Annex, Timeline, 207. 
117 Joya Wesley, "Mayor Pro Tern, Author to Speak at Final Truth Commission Hearing," International 
Center for Transitional Justice, 29 Sept 2005, www.ictj.org/enlnews/press/release/255.html. 
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The Commission completed its work by examining the statements taken from 
community members, evidence provided at public hearings, evidence from conversations 
with groups of people involved in the events surrounding the massacre, media coverage, 
and official records they had access to. The Commission also interviewed members of 
groups such as Morningside Homes residents who were living there at the time of the 
massacre, demonstrators who survived the massacre, media personnel who covered the 
massacre and the subsequent trials, as well as a former KKK member and police officer 
who had been on duty at the time of the massacre. I 18 Altogether the Commission received 
150 testimonies, 55 given at public hearings, and 95 given privately, 12 of which were 
confidential. 1l9 The process of gathering testimony by the GTRC was a thorough and 
inclusive process, which once again aided in the GTRC's legitimacy. 
2.2.5 Responses of the Greensboro Political Community 
The Greensboro TRC received a wide range of responses from Greensboro 
community members. It managed to gamer wide support from the community, but at the 
same time met with repeated resistance from those in positions of public power and 
authority. This sub-section will explore the responses to the GTRC process by the 
Greensboro political community, i.e. the City Council, the Mayor, as well as editorial 
responses in the local media. 
As early as March 15,2005, the GTRCP requested support of the project by the 
City Council. The GTRCP presented the City Council with a petition, for which they had 
acquired 5,000 signatures. The petition asked the City Council to "endorse and fully 
support the truth and reconciliation process, and to encourage the community to do the 
same.,,120 The City Council agreed to put the petition on the agenda for their meeting on 
April 19, 2005. 121 At that meeting, April 19, the City Council voted 6-3 to oppose the 
work of the truth and reconciliation commission. The City Council voted along white-
118 Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report, Annex, Timeline, 206-8. 
119 Bermanzohn, "A Massacre Survivor Reflects," 105. 
120 Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report, Annex, Timeline, 204. 
121 Ibid., 206. 
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black lines. 122 This factor was significant in that it indicated the racial divide concerning 
perceptions of the process, and thus indicated the challenge that reconciliation posed; for 
genuine reconciliation requires a willingness on both sides of the divide to participate. 
The City Council was approached again after the Commission had completed its 
work. On March 6,2007, Councilwoman Goldie Wells presented the City Council with a 
resolution calling on the Council to rescind the original decision in 2005 to oppose the 
GTRC, and to "take the recommendations [of the Commission Report] seriously," as well 
as to encourage citizens to read the Final Report. Once again, the City Council voted to 
tum down the resolution, this time 5_4. 123 Councilman Tom Phillips called the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission a "crock" and "you can quote me on that.,,124 Also in January 
2007, an intense argument was sparked by mention of the need for a public statement 
regarding the GTRC at a City Council retreat. 125 Some Council members were firmly in 
support of the Commission. For example, Councilwoman Goldie Wells gave a passionate 
speech in support of the Commission, when presenting her proposal. 126 Councilwoman 
and Mayor Pro Tern Yvonne Johnson actually testified at the third round of public 
hearings. 127 From this it is clear that viewpoints regarding the commission in the City 
Council were polarized and passionate. 
The mayor of Greensboro, Keith Holliday strongly opposed the GTRC. He did, 
nevertheless, nominate Judge Lawrence McSwain to the Selection Panel. He expressed 
concern that the commission would draw attention to Greensboro's violent past and 
would portray Greensboro to the rest of the nation as a "battleground". 128 He also 
commented that the Commission's report was "biased" and that he didn't accept the 
122 Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report, Executive Summary, 25. 
123 Margaret Moffet Banks, "Council votes down TRC resolution," Greensboro News and Record, 7 March 
2007, www.news-record.comlapps/pbcs.dll/article? AID=/200703071NEWSRECO 1 0 1170306035/-
lINEWSRECRARKIVE. 
124 "The sounds of silence," Greensboro News and Record, sec. A, 29 Jan 2007. 
125 Margaret Moffet Banks, "Mention ofTRC starts argument," Greensboro News and Record, sec. B, 21 
Jan 2007. 
126 Banks, "Council Votes Down TRC Resolution." 
127 Wesley, "Mayor Pro Tern, Author to speak at Final Commission Hearing." 
128 "Reconciliation in Greensboro" [audiorecording], PBS Religion & Ethics, Episode 810, 5 Nov 2004, 
www.pbs.orglwnet/religionandethics/week81 01 cover.html. 
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findings. 129 He also adamantly refused any suggestion that the City should apologize for 
the complicity found in the final Report on behalf of the city and the police department. 
"At most, city leaders should continue to express regrets over the shootings.,,130 Mayor 
Holliday was also quoted in the GTRC's Final Report as having said that he found it 
"unappetizing" to participate in a process that speaks openly about issues such as poverty, 
labor, capital, race and hate. l3l 
In the GTRC's Final Report further instances of active resistance to the truth 
seeking process within the community are listed. Apart from the City Council vote to 
oppose the truth-seeking process, City Council members were also involved in spreading 
rumors as to the GTRC's funding and its relationship to the GTRCP and in leaking 
confidential information (which 'jeopardized public hearings") to the media. In other 
instances, individuals claim to have been discouraged by those outside the process from 
testifying at the hearings, while the Commission's filing cabinets which contained 
research documents and personnel files were broken into and damaged. 132 
During and after the process, the Greensboro News and Record printed multiple 
editorials, both for and against, the truth and reconciliation process. Editorials ranged 
from "Truth Report is a Gift- Read It" to "T &R Commission is silly, not 'Historic' .,,133 
However, allegations were made that the News and Record was biased against the GTRC, 
publishing more editorials that opposed the Commission than opinion editorials for it134. 
One editorial published in the News and Record painted the Commission as politically 
biased, as the Commission consistently used "progressive politics vocabulary." In other 
words, the op-ed author painted the process as a politically liberal (in a liberal-
129 Banks, "Council votes down resolution on TRC." 
130 Margaret Moffet Banks, "Holliday: no apology necessary", Greensboro News and Record, sec. A, 1 
June 2006. 
131 Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report, Executive Summary, 26 
132 Ibid., 25. 
133 Nelson Johnson, "Truth Report is a Gift-Read It," Greensboro News and Record, sec. A, 14 June 2006; 
Steve Gorden, "T&R Commission is Silly, not 'Historic,''' Greensboro News and Record, sec. A, 20 June 
2006. 
134 Margaret Moffett Banks, "Papers Coverage Criticized as Biased" Greensboro News and Record, sec. B 
31 May 2006; Allen Johnson, "Have the Opinion Pages been Biased against Truth and Reconciliation?" 
Greensboro News and Record, sec. H, 4 June 4 2006. 
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conservative dichotomy), as opposed to as an objective, project. I35 Another editorial also 
accused the Truth and Reconciliation process as biased, although it praised certain 
aspects of the Report, such as clearing up the misrepresentation of the event being a clash 
of two "radical" groups. 136 
Despite these criticisms (which is typical of truth and reconciliation processes 
everywhere), the Commission seemed to receive wide community support. The initial 
evidence for this is the petition presented to the City Council, which received 5,000 
signatures asking for the City Council's support of the Commission's work. 137 The 
second indicator of community support was the size of the crowds present at the 
commission ceremonies and public hearings. Over 1,000 people attended a march entitled 
the "Transforming Tragedy into Triumph" March for Justice, Democracy and 
Reconciliation on November 13, 2004. 138 At the swearing in ceremony, a crowd of an 
estimated 500 + people attended. 139 Hundreds of people attended the public hearings. 140 
The Commission enjoyed the support of multiple community leaders, whose 
prestige aided in drawing attention and weight to the process itself. Such leaders included 
former Mayor of Greensboro Carolyn Allen, Reverends from local churches, (Reverend 
Z Holler, Reverend Gregory Headen, Reverend Herbert Nelson), Congressman Melvin 
Watt, Reverend WW Finlader, Cynthia Brown, District Court Judge Lawrence McSwain, 
as well as internationally renowned leaders and scholars such as Archbishop Desmond 
Tutu and Dr. Cornell West. 
In effect, the goal of reconciliation of the community could only be achieved if 
the majority of the community participated and supported the goals of the process. The 
negative opinions regarding the Commission by those in power, particularly white 
135 Doug Clark, "Commission Proposes Political Agenda", Greensboro News and Record, sec. A, 31 May 
2006. 
136 Edward Cone, "TRC Delivers a Flawed by Useful Report," Greensboro News and Record, sec. H, 4 
June 2006. 
137 Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Final Report, Annex, Timeline, 206. 
138 Ibid., 202. 
139 Ibid., 204. 
140 "Greensboro Truth and Community Reconciliation Project: Commission (2004-2006)", Greensboro 
Truth and Community Reconciliation Project, www.gtcrp.org/commissiontimeline.php. 
41 
University of Cape Town
politicians, certainly created a challenge, which the Commission had to face. However, 
with widespread community support and both local and international figures supporting 
the project, the Commission had a better chance at both gaining legitimacy as well has 
having a chance at starting a process of genuine reconciliation. I will touch on both issues 
of legitimacy and reconciliation in later sub-sections. 
2.2.6 Engaging the Local Community 
As an unofficial truth process that sought to further reconciliation, community 
engagement was of utmost importance, for community reconciliation cannot occur in a 
bubble without the community itself. Such engagement became more pressing, as well as 
more difficult, in the face of "official rejection." This section will explore the ways in 
which the GTRC tried to engage the community: how the commission overcame the 
challenge of access to the media, and how it launched a plethora of community events 
and discussions to encourage an ongoing process of reconciliation. 
In order for the local community to be engaged in the GTRC, then access to the 
media would playa large role in both generating awareness and encouraging 
participation. But for an unofficial truth process without substantial resources, this was a 
major challenge requiring sustained effort and ingenuity. From the beginning of the 
process, the GTRCP and the GTRC held press conferences and other meetings with 
media representatives, and published all landmark documents in the local newspaper the 
Greensboro News and Record. 
The GTRCP kept up an active relationship with local media, urging the public to 
participate in the truth and reconciliation process. The GTRC Mandate and Selection 
Process documents were published in a two-page spread, along with a call for 
nominations of commissioners from the community, in the Greensboro News and 
Record, the primary newspaper in Greensboro. These documents were also published in 
the Carolina Peacemaker and the Rhinoceros Times. 141 Subsequent articles, such as 
141 Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report, Annex, Timeline, 202. 
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announcements regarding the public hearings, community dialogue events and opinion 
editorials were also published in the Greensboro News and Record. 
In February 2004, the commission hired a media consultant, Joya Wesley. 142 This 
enabled press releases, drafted by Joya Wesley, to be given to media sources on a 
systematic bases. The press releases were released from the platform of the leTJ. 143 In 
active pursuit of media coverage and community engagement, the Commission held a 
breakfast meeting with media representatives on March 23, 2004 to discuss how to make 
the commission's work "more accessible to reporters.,,144 
Another way in which the Commission attempted to engage the community was a 
door-to-door campaign to raise awareness about the Commission, and to collect 
statements from people with any information on the 1979 Massacre. The door-to-door 
campaign took place on Wednesday afternoons and began in April 2004. 145 Reminiscent 
of the televised public hearings of the South African TRC, Greensboro Community 
Television, a community television station, aired a television show entitled "TRC Talk" 
throughout the process, premiering on July 6,2005. The television show was produced in 
the North Carolina A & T University TV studio. The show ran twice a week, featuring 
coverage from the public hearings, as well as interviews with Commissioners, interns and 
community members. 146 Also throughout the process, a Greensboro Truth and 
Reconciliation blog was continually updated online, accessible to all. The blog presented 
itself as "A Space for Open Community Dialogue About the Work of the Commission." 
The blog encourages people to try to understand other people's perspectives before 
responding, to feel free to disagree with other peoples' opinions in a respectful way, and 
to try to present accurate information. Posted on the blog was a weekly newsletter 
entitled Ubuntu, in which the Commission posted the latest news and events being held in 
conjunction with the commission's work. Here once again we can see the influence of the 
142 Ibid., 204. 
143 "United States (Greensboro, NC)," International Center for Transitional Justice, 
www.ictj.org/en/where/region 2/5 17.html. 
144 Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report, Annex, Timeline, 206. 
145 Ibid., 206. 
146 "Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission: News and Events: TRC Talk," Greensboro Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission, www.greensborotrc.org/trc_talk.php. 
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TRC in the GTRC process with the use of the South African term ubuntu, meaning a 
person is a person through persons. 147 In addition the blog posted articles about the 
Commission, public hearing transcripts, "thank-you" notes to members of the community 
for participating in Commission dialogues, and individualized responses from the 
commission to individual posters' questions. In one such case, for example, an answer 
was posted to the question, "What is Truth? Whose Truth?". 148 The web sites of both the 
GTCRP as well as the GTRC were accessible, easily navigated, and contained a plethora 
of information regarding the process. Once the Report was released, it was accessible for 
free from the GTRC website. 149 
The GTRC's efforts to gain media access and coverage were not limited to local 
media only. With a wider audience in mind, the Greensboro TRC was billed as the "first 
truth and reconciliation process to take place in the United States.,,150 As such, and 
through the support and platform of the prestigious ICTJ, the process managed to garner 
significant national and international coverage. The Greensboro TRC was covered in 
news sources such as Newsweek, National Public Radio (NPR), the French magazine 
Elle, as well as many others. 151 According to a press release from the ICTJ, the 
Greensboro TRC managed to get coverage in hundreds of newspapers and magazines 
nationally and internationally. 152 
However, the first priority of the GTRC remained the need to stimulate and 
facilitate ongoing community conversation. As such, a plethora of community events, 
such as town-hall like meetings, discussion groups and interfaith prayer meetings, were 
scheduled before, during and after the GTRC process with the aim of engaging the 
community in dialogue and community-building exercises. 
147 Tutu, No Future Without Forgiveness. 
148 Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission Blog, http://gtrc.blogspot.com/. 
149 It is emphasized on the website, that though the offices for the GTRC have closed, the website will 
remain up and running as a resource for the community and other communities around the nation. 
150 Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, www.greensborotrc.org. 
151 Ellis Cose, "How to Mend a Massacre," Newsweek, 2 June 2003, www.newsweek.com/idl59474; 
"Greensboro to Re-Examine 1979 KKK-Related Deaths," All Things Considered, National Public Radio, 
13 June 2004; "Greensboro Truth and Community Reconciliation Project: Commission (2004-2006)", 
Greensboro Truth and Community Reconciliation Project, www.gtcrp.org/commissiontimeline.php. 
152 Wesley, "Mayor Pro Tern, Author to Speak at Final Commission Hearing." 
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Sustained attempts were made to engage with the community in the reconciliation 
project by means of spiritual or religious discourse. Not unlike the example of the 
rhetoric surrounding the South African TRC and its Chair Archbishop Tutu, the GTRC 
employed a notably spiritual rhetoric. A number of interfaith events were organized in 
Greensboro during the reconciliation process. Several such events took place, such as a 
panel discussion entitled "Spiritual Preparation for Truth-Seeking, Healing and 
Reconciliation: A Gathering of People from All Spiritual Traditions and Walks of Life," 
on October 31, 2003,153 a Faith, Prayer and Reconciliation Service on April 10, 2005 and 
an Interfaith Spiritual Reflection Community Service on June 16,2005. 154 
In addition to these interfaith services, other panel discussions and community 
dialogues also took place on the topic of truth and reconciliation. Perhaps the biggest 
mobilization of community members was at a 2004 march marking the 25th anniversary 
of the Massacre organized by the Beloved Community Center, The march was entitled 
"Transforming Tragedy into Triumph," and over 1,000 community members 
participated. 155 
A number of community dialogues were hosted including: an open community 
dialogue, "What is Truth? What is Reconciliation?" held at the Greensboro Central 
Library, facilitated by UNCG's Ashby Dialogue series156 and a panel discussion entitled 
"Healing Via Truth and Reconciliation" at North Carolina A&T University in which the 
GTRC staff participated. 157 A number of GTRC open houses were hosted, as well as a 
community meeting on October 2,2003 to update the public on the progress the GTRC 
had made. 158 A number of interactive workshops also took place, for example, the GTRC 
cosponsored a poetry event entitled "Poetry, Truth and Reconciliation" on April 22, 
2006. 159 
After the GTRC process was complete, a strategy of recruiting organizations and 
community groups as "report receivers" was put in place. "Report receivers" committed 
themselves to reading the report and to facilitate dialogue within their respective 
153 Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report, Annex, Timeline, 203. 
154 Ibid., 206-7. 
155 Ibid., 205. 
156 Ibid., 205. 
157 Ibid., 209. 
158 Ibid., 203. 
159 Ibid., 209. 
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organizations to find ways in which the resolutions called for in the Report could be 
furthered by efforts on the part of the organization itself. A total of 70 community groups 
committed to be report receivers in this way. The Report was presented to the report 
receivers at the closing ceremony on May 25,2005. 160 The community was encouraged 
to get together to host discussions regarding the Report. Groups were supposed to gather 
independently at various locations to discuss their reception of the Report. 161 Following 
the release of the report, a number of town-hall style meetings were scheduled for the 
community to come together to discuss the final Report. The talks were scheduled for 
December 2,2006, March 11,2007, June 10,2007 and September 9,2007. 162 An article 
in the Greensboro News and Record, however, indicated that these discussion groups 
were slow to get under way. 163 According to local news reports, an average 95 people 
showed up for the town-hall style meetings. Conspicuously absent at these meetings were 
those who had opposed the process and final Report. Such absence, it was lamented, 
detracted from a process of genuine community reconciliation. 164 
At another level, that of schools and education, teachers throughout the area 
incorporated the truth and reconciliation process and final Report into their curricula. A 
workshop was held for local teachers at higher education institutions entitled "Teaching 
through the TRC." The event was put on by the GTRC on September 28, 2005. Lecturers 
in the Greensboro area incorporated the GTRC final Report into their curricula at 
University of North Carolina Greensboro, Guilford College and Guilford Technical 
Community College. 165 In addition, students engaged in the truth and reconciliation 
process through scheduling a student event focused on the process. On April 14, 2007, 
students from local colleges and universities held a conference in which community 
160 Ibid., 209. 
161 Sue Schultz, "Group begins 'truth' study talks," Greensboro News and Record, sec. B, 17 July 2006. 
162 Lex Alexander, "TRC panelists: City must own up to past," Greensboro News and Record, 4 Dec 2006, 
www.news-
record.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article? AID=1200612041NEWSRECO 1 0 1161204030311 005lNEWSRECO 1 0 1. 
163 Lex Alexander, "Truth Report Discussions Slow to Start," Greensboro News and Record, sec. B, 16 
July 2006. 
164 Jordan Green, "Truth Report is discussed despite hostility, disinterest," YES! Weekly, 14 March 2007, 
www.yesweekly.com/main.asp?Search= 1 &ArticleID=2250&SectionID= 1 &SubSectionID=&S= 1. 
165 Lex Alexander, "This term's homework: truth report," Greensboro News and Record, sec. B, 20 Aug 
2006. 
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members were encouraged to write papers, stage performances and submit research. The 
best submissions were awarded a prize of $1 00. 166 
Community outreach efforts attempted to create grassroots support and 
participation from Greensboro residents, despite the rejection of the process by the 
majority of the Council and Mayor. The community dialogues allowed for conversations 
around race and community cleavages to take place, which fleshed out the process of the 
Commission to a level at which real engagement between community members around 
tough, taboo and unspoken of issues could be given a space. 
2.2.7 The Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report 
After a period of two years, the Commission released its Final Report, which is 
over 500 pages long. The Report provides a comprehensive review of the historical 
context of the events of November 3, 1979: the history of community dynamics relevant 
to the massacre, the main events leading up to the massacre, and outline of the specific 
happenings which occurred on the morning of November 3, 1979, an analysis of the 
outcomes of the criminal and civil trials, an assessment of positive and negative outcomes 
for the community resulting from the massacre, as well as a chapter proposing 
recommendations for reforms, reparations and measures to be taken to further 
reconciliation of the community. 
The Report shows a sustained attempt on the part of the Commission to remain as 
objective as possible, sometimes stretching generosity. For example, in regards to 
comments made by KKK members that amounted to blatant hate speech, the Commission 
notes that these comments are protected by their constitutional rights to free speech. 167 In 
addition, the commission includes statements from those who participated in the killings 
(Griffm for example, who showed no remorse) to illustrate how these perpetrators have 
also suffered from trauma. The objectiveness of the Commission is one of the 
predominant factors in determining the legitimacy of the Commission. This issue is 
especially pertinent in the context of the GTRC, which was initiated by people who were 
166 Lex Alexander, "Students seek papers on reconciliation," Greensboro News and Record, sec. B, 28 Feb 
2007. 
167 Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report, 13. 
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all on one side of the conflict, that of the Workers' Viewpoint Organization. For example, 
one of the ways which the Commission could be easily written off to be illegitimate, 
would be to paint the Report as biased, as was the view espoused by Mayor Keith 
Holliday. 168 Therefore this concerted effort at impartiality must be understood in light of 
that challenge. 
The reparation recommendations in the Commission's final Report included: 
having the city recognize the date ofN ovember 3, 1979 as a day of remembrance; that 
those who participated in the massacre, as well as the police department, should 
apologize to those they harmed publicly or private, as well as building a public 
monument on the site of the massacre in memory of those killed. 169 The Report also has a 
section with recommendations on institutional reforms. These include wide-sweeping 
recommendations such as having city employees paid a living wage; having city 
employees participate in anti-racism workshops; instituting a police review board; as well 
as a laundry list of further recommendations aimed at improving race relations and 
promoting justice. 170 
2.3 Overcoming the Challenges of an Unofficial Truth Process 
Although the GTRC established linkages with the International Center for 
Transitional Justice (lCTJ), a leading organization in the field of transitional justice, and 
had the advantage of experienced advisors to aid and guide them in designing the initial 
project, the GTRC remained a civil-society based unofficial truth process. As such, the 
GTRC inevitably faced the challenges confronting all unofficial truth processes, as 
discussed in the opening chapter, in particular that of establishing its necessary 
legitimacy as a truth and reconciliation process, while lacking the resources and funding 
available to official truth commissions, and without the legal power granted to official 
commissions. In effect, the GTRC process may be regarded as a case study of the ways 
and extent to which an unofficial truth project may be able to achieve the transitional 
justice objectives of truth and reconciliation process at the level of a local community. In 
168 Banks, "Council votes down resolution on TRC." 
169 Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report, Recommendations, 200-7 
170 Ibid., 203. 
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the following sections, I will explore how the GTRC dealt with, to the best of its ability, 
the challenges posed by virtue of its unofficial status. 
2.3.1 Establishing Legitimacy as an Unofficial Truth Process in a Local Community 
Establishing legitimacy is a challenge faced by every truth process-both official, 
as well as unofficiaL Even in the context of official truth commissions, the legitimacy of 
the commission must be earned by an inclusive, fair and transparent process. Important 
political actors may still oppose or criticize an official truth commission, for example, 
even the TRC report in South Africa was heavily criticized by members of the former 
apartheid regime. I7I The importance of establishing legitimacy is an even heavier burden 
in the context of unofficial truth processes, as the unofficial project has no constitutional 
mandate or legal status as do truth commissions, and cannot claim to operate with the 
authority of the state. The local orientation combined with the unofficial status of the 
truth project also lends the project to criticism as biased, as the project is likely to be 
bound up with local partisan conflicts. Therefore, it is incumbent upon unofficial truth 
projects to attempt to establish legitimacy: a feat that is both a major obstacle and a vital 
condition for any civil society-based unofficial truth process. 
In the case of the GTRC, the proposed truth and reconciliation project was not 
only unofficial, but explicitly opposed by local government. In these circumstances, the 
challenge of the Commission achieving a sufficient measure of legitimacy was even 
greater. As pointed out in the literature on truth commissions, the composition, identity 
and collective ideologies of commissioners significantly add or detract from the 
"authority" of a commission. 172 Even more important than the composition of the 
Commission itself, was the process through which it was nominated: to the extent that an 
inclusive and democratically participatory nomination process could be designed, its 
legitimacy could carry over to the actual Commission. This was realized by those 
involved in the initial stages, i.e. the Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Project 
(GTCRP), who did not proceed directly to the appointment of a Commission but (on the 
171 Borer, "Truth Telling as a Peace Building Activity," 23. 
172 Levinson, "Trials, Commissions, and Investigating Committees," 223. 
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advice of the rCTJ) instead designed a complex two-stage Selection Process. This 
strategy effectively distanced the original sponsors of the truth project from the actual 
Commission, so that the GTRC would not be seen as simply a creature of the GTCRP, 
but rather as an effort which was collaborated on by a number of community groups from 
all sectors of society. As we have seen, this process did not entirely succeed in its 
inclusive objectives, and the non-involvement of constituencies such as the Sons of 
Confederate Veterans and the Daughters of the Confederacy, may have affected the 
perceived legitimacy of the Commission. Through boycotting the process, those 
represented in these organizations, could effectively claim that the process was 
illegitimate and the Report was biased. 
A second strategy for bolstering the legitimacy of the Commission was through 
securing the involvement of individuals with recognized public status in the process. It 
has been noted that their legitimacy is closely related to the public status of the 
individuals serving on that commission by virtue of the "general status of the persons 
offering acknowledgement." 173 Thus, official commissions retain their legitimacy not 
only through formal proclamation, but by virtue of the profile of those on the 
commission. This is even more important in the case ofUTPs. A process that notably 
includes individuals who have high public profiles, especially those who have achieved 
standing in the eyes of the community by virtue of elected positions, has a better prospect 
of achieving legitimacy. The high profile status of many involved in the GTRC process, 
such as US Representative Melvin Watt, Dr. Vincent Harding, Archbishop Desmond 
Tutu, Judge Lawrence McSwain, Dr. Cornel West, various community religious leaders, 
and Carolyn Allen, a former Mayor of Greensboro, added weight to the process in the 
eyes of the community. 
But in the end, it was the Commission's legitimacy in the local community itself 
that ultimately affected the Commission's impact. In this regard, the origins of the 
GTRCP, (as resultant of a collaborative effort of people involved on only one side of the 
conflict,) the close association of the GTRCP to the GTRC, and the particular racial and 
social dynamics of the city proved a catch-22. The staff of the GTRCP, as the effective 
173 Levinson, "Trials, Commissions, and Investigating Committees," 221. 
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founders of the "truth process", were closely involved emotionally with the events of 
November 3, 1979 by virtue of being survivors or widows of the massacre, all on the side 
of the Worker's Viewpoint Organization / Communist Workers Party. Similarly, the 
organizations responsible for the initial funding of the project, the Beloved Community 
Center and the Greensboro Justice Fund, were perceived to belong to a very specific 
camp, that of the politically "progressive" (as opposed to "conservative") politics 174 
Leading individuals who had been involved on the side of the Worker's Viewpoint 
Organization, such as Nelson Johnson, the founder of the Beloved Community Center, 
also figured prominently on the GTRC. This meant that the GTRC struggled to establish 
the legitimacy of the truth process in the eyes of the wider community. For example, 
Mayor Holliday was quoted as dOUbting the neutrality of the Commission, considering 
the fact that Reverend Johnson was on the National Advisory Committee of the GTRC. 175 
Overall, the GTRC's legitimacy rested on a number of factors: the wide-scale 
community engagement, the democratic nature of electing commissioners, the diverse 
identities of commissioners, the high profile status of commissioners and other 
individuals serving in different stages of the process, by the efforts to separate the 
commission from any outside influences, and especially by the involvement by the lCTJ, 
an internationally recognized organization. Of particular importance were the efforts to 
separate the Commission from sectional influences and associations. Though it cannot be 
said that the Commission was entirely successful in achieving these objectives, it did 
manage to do so to a significant degree. 
2.3.2 Overcoming Material and Formal Constraints: the GTRC's Funding and Lack 
of Legal Powers 
As an unofficial truth process, the GTRC was faced by substantial material and 
formal constraints: it did not receive any funds or other resources from the state, and did 
not have the public standing or legal powers of an official truth commission. In practice, 
174 Clark, "Commission Poses Political Agenda." 
175 Cose, "How to Mend a Massacre," 2. 
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the GTRC was funded by a combination of grants and private donations. The Angus 
Family Fund Grand provided the initial grant, an amount of $185,000, which enabled the 
formation of the GTRCP and the recruitment of the help of the ICTJ. Subsequently, once 
the Commission had been appointed, it garnered an estimated $37,000 from individual 
donations and benefit concert proceeds, as well as securing a number of additional grants 
from various funds. 176 The total budget for the commission amounted to $425,109.48. 
Compared to the much more substantial resources available to some official Truth 
Commissions this was a minimal amount. On the other hand, the GTRC operated within 
the much smaller context of one local community only and focused on a single major 
event, the 1979 Massacre. Within this context, it was able to mount and sustain an 
effective truth process over a period of two years. 
In practice, a significant disadvantage of unofficial truth processes is the lack of 
any legal powers. Unlike an official Truth Commission, like the South African TRC, the 
GTRC did not have any powers of search and seizure, or subpoena powers to summons 
individuals to appear and testify at its public hearings. The Commission did not have 
access to confidential government documents, or police files. This challenge is 
acknowledged in the Commission's final report as "serious limitations" which "restricted 
our ability to review all the evidence available. The truth we have found is necessarily 
imperfect." 177 
However, despite its lack of legal power, the Commission did manage to access a 
significant amount of evidence. For example, the Greensboro News and Record procured 
the Commission with FBI files that they had in their records in regards to the time period 
surrounding the Massacre.178 In addition, some individuals who may be considered to 
have been complicit with the Massacre, or even directly involved in the attacks, still 
participated without having to be formally subpoenaed. A member of the KKK at the 
time, Roland Wayne Wood, who had participated in the attack, offered his testimony and 
expressed regret and his support of the truth and reconciliation process. 179 In addition, 
Virgil Griffin, a KKK grand wizard since 1985 and a member of the KKKlNazi caravan 
177 Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report, Executive Summary, 3. 
178 Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report, Annex, Timeline, 208. 
179 Ibid., 208. 
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who had been tried and acquitted for the murders, also testified at the hearings. 180 Griffin 
indicated that he was hostile to the GTRC, but had appeared in response to public 
pressure. He seemed to show no remorse, claiming that anti-Klan protestors had been 
killed because "God guided the Klan's bullets." Nevertheless, he did participate. 181 
Gorrell Pierce, a former Nazi and the Grand Wizard of the Federated Knights of the Klu 
Klux Klan in 1979 also provided testimony. 182 A retired police officer who served in the 
police department at the time of the event offered his testimony, and also produced 
relevant documents. 183 Three police officers who had been on duty at the time of the 
shootings also testified at the public hearings, but emphasized that they did not represent 
the police department. 184 It should be emphasized, however, that even though some 
perpetrators participated, there was no incentive for them to come forward with the whole 
truth. For example, in the context of the TRC, incentive was given to perpetrators to tell 
the whole truth, in that had they done so, and their crimes deemed to be politically 
motivated, they were granted amnesty. The GTRC possessed no such powers. Therefore, 
it was felt by one survivor, Sally Bermanzohn, that the police and Klan members used the 
public testimony platform to once again further their own distortions of the story. She 
expressed her anger at hearing "the same lies and cover-ups" told by police officers and 
Klan members, the same cover-up story that she had heard for 26 years. 18S Willingness of 
"perpetrators" to participate in the hearings may have been influenced by the prominent 
restorative justice discourse of the process, and the repeatedly emphasized fact that the 
Commission did not seek to prosecute or accuse any member of the community. Such 
rhetoric may have encouraged participation from those who might otherwise have felt 
threatened by the prospect of prosecution or vengeful sentiments. 
Apart from the Commission's lack of formal powers of subpoena etc., it also 
lacked the general public standing of an official Truth Commission. This significantly 
undercut its ability to provide the "acknowledgement" of victims, which is a main 
180 Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report, Recommendations, 345. 
181 Bermanzohn, "A Massacre Survivor Reflects", 106. 
182 Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report, Recommendations, 347. 
183 Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report, Annex, Timeline, 208. 
184 Bermanzohn, "A Massacre Survivor Reflects," 106. 
185 Ibid,. 107. 
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objective of truth and reconciliation processes. In tenns of the Commission's mandate, 
one of its main goals was to "acknowledge" those affected by the Massacre and the 
surrounding events. As the GTRC was unofficial, and not only unofficial, but explicitly 
opposed by local government, any kind of official acknowledgement was completely out 
of the question. However, the commission did garner significant support from elements 
of the local community, including the participation of important figures in that 
community as well as that of people who had been involved in the attacks of that day. To 
that extent, some kind of community acknowledgment of the victims did take place 
through the GTRC process. 
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Chapter 3: Beyond Natural Disaster: Community Truth-Telling Mobilizations to 
address Human Rights Abuse and Hurricane Katrina 
3.1 Introduction: Unofficial truth process in the wake of a natural/political disaster? 
Truth seeking in the context of Hurricane Katrina has taken place on two levels: 
in regards to examining the causes for the hurricane, the causes for the breach in the 
levees and explaining the breakdown in government response-which has taken the form 
of federal governmental commissions of enquiry; as well as on the level of documenting 
government liability, and human rights abuses connected with the storm-which has 
taken the form of human rights reports and community-based truth-telling efforts. The 
most striking distinction between the two forms of truth seeking is in who is talked with 
in order to understand the "truth," as well as what the focus of the reports were and who 
the authors of the fmal report were. 
Commissions of enquiry have focused very specifically on federal government 
inefficiencies and mistakes. Information was gathered primarily through talking with 
government officials who were responsible, to best explain what happened 'in-house,' in 
order to be able to make changes to respond better in the next instance. Three reports 
were produced by government bodies: one from the Department of Homeland Security, 186 
one from the Senate,187 and one from the House of Representatives. 188 The community 
truth-telling efforts on the other hand, focus largely on the experiences of the victims 
through talking directly with the victims or representatives of organizations who have 
been helping victims on the ground to understand their side of the story, and to illustrate 
their experience with abuse at the hands government officials and agencies. Another way 
186 Department of Homeland Security, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, by 
Frances Fragos Townsend, (Washington DC: 2006), http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-
learned.pdf. 
187 Special Report of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, US Senate, 
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared, S. Report 109-322, 109th Congress, 2nd Session, by Susan 
Collins, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2006), 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/katrinanation.html. 
188 Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, A 
Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for 
and Response to Hurricane Katrina, HR. Report 109-377, 109th Congress, 2nd Session, by Tom Davis, 
(Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2006), 
http://www .gpoaccess.gov/ serial set/ creports/katrina.html. 
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in which the truth-telling efforts focus rather on the victims, is that the reports of focused 
on victim-based recommendations. The recommendations made in governmental reports 
are aimed at improving communication within the government and improving disaster 
response, whereas the truth-telling efforts make recommendations as to how restitution, 
both symbolic and concrete, should be brought to the victims of the storm. 
Another point of difference is in who has authored the reports. Government 
agents have authored the government reports, whereas civilians have authored the truth-
telling effort reports. This distinction is important in that, in the context of government 
liability, the government has a lot at stake, which could affect the objectivity, or at least 
language used, in the reports. For example, one of the leaders of the Katrina National 
Justice Commission critiqued the House Bipartisan Commission report heavily, as it was 
not a genuinely "bipartisan" commission, in effect complaining about who controlled and 
authored that particular government report. 189 On the other hand, victim-centered 
processes have much to gain by proving the mistakes and abuses by the government, 
which could also affect the spin and language used during the writing of the report. For 
example, less attention may be paid to the ways in which government failures could be 
explained, but rather point to the government failure itself. 
Compared to the GTRC, the community truth-telling processes are ambivalent 
and problematic when considered as unofficial truth projects. On the one hand, the 
projects examined in this paper borrow language and procedure directly from transitional 
justice mechanisms, such as the terms 'justice commission," "tribunal" and the holding 
of public hearings. On the other hand, some important distinctions are warranted. For 
one, the Katrina projects are not so much focused on communal reconciliation, but rather 
on achieving reparations and recognition. In this regard, their focus is slightly shifted 
from that of Greensboro, which resulted in completely different aims and types of 
projects. The Katrina projects also were less focused on inclusiveness than the GTRC 
was. As I shall point out, both projects took place from specific segments of the 
population, without much effort at building coalitions and putting measures in place to 
ensure objectivity. In this chapter I will explore ways in which the truth projects after 
189 Ida Caruthers, "Roundtable: Religion'S Response to Katrina" [Audiorecording], NPR's News and Notes 
with Ed Gordon, 25 September 2005, NPR, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4860629. 
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Katrina may be considered unofficial truth processes, and in what ways there are 
important distinctions to be made. 
3.2.1 Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath in context 
Hurricane Katrina was a category 5 hurricane that hit the United States on August 
29,2005. The storm caused massive damage along the Gulf Coast, and caused notorious 
damage in New Orleans, where the breaching of the levees protecting New Orleans 
caused 80 % of the city to flood. 19o Katrina was one of the most deadly hurricanes to ever 
hit the United States. The storm and subsequent flooding resulted in the deaths of 1,836 
people. 191 Though Hurricane Katrina was a "natural disaster," at every level of 
preparation for and response to the storm, Hurricane Katrina amounted to a man-made 
disaster. At the intersection of poverty and negligence, and some claim racism, an entire 
population of the city had been made vulnerable, forgotten and abused. 192 
New Orleans was flooded for four days before the city was able to pump out the 
majority of the water. Thousands of people, by a vast majority African American, had 
remained in the city, some because of choice, but most because of misinformation or 
inability to evacuate due to lack of private transportation-the sole mode of 
evacuation.193 Citizens flocked to the Superdome, which is the New Orleans football 
stadium, as well as the Convention Center to seek refuge from the storm. An estimated 
16,000 people were trapped in the Superdome. 194 Other people were left stranded, 
trapped inside their houses and standing on top of their roofs, waiting to be rescued. After 
the storm, the conditions inside the Superdome began to deteriorate, and people inside 
were not permitted to leave until a formal evacuation took place. There was no running 
water, no food, no electricity and no sewage system. People were stuck inside the 
Superdome for four days in hot and unsanitary conditions before the Superdome was 
190 "Hurricane Katrina," Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikiiHurricane Katrina. 
191 Ibid., 1. -
192 Michael Eric Dyson, Come Hell or High Water: Hurricane Katrina and the Color of Disaster (New 
York: Basic Civitas Books, 2006). 
193 Laura Butterbaugh, "Why did Hurricane Katrina hit Women so Hard?" Off our Backs 35 (2005):18. 
194 Scott Gold, "Trapped in the Superdome: Refuge becomes a Hellhole," Los Angeles Times, 1 September 
2005. 
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evacuated completely. 195 Meanwhile, on the outside, fear of violence took hold and the 
government mobilized the National Guard to go to New Orleans to "keep order." The 
days following the storm were chaotic and traumatic, with massive human rights abuses 
taking place, such as the failure to evacuate 6,000 prisoners trapped in cells in the flooded 
prison,196 among other abuse which will be discussed in the subsequent section. 
Eventually the city underwent mandatory evacuation, bussing survivors to 
different cities across the country, especially those close by such as Houston, Texas and 
Atlanta, Georgia. Approximately 1 million people were displaced because of Katrina. As 
the majority of damaged property was private property located in low-income areas, the 
cleanup after Hurricane Katrina and the return of residents has been notoriously slow, 
especially for African American and low-income residents. Because most of the houses 
damaged were private property, the government has been able to abdicate responsibility 
for rebuilding, and as most home insurance policies include a caveat for flooding, most 
homeowners have found themselves in a catch-22, unable to cover both the mortgage as 
well as clean-up and rebuilding costs. This has resulted in large parts of the Lower 9th 
Ward, the neighborhood hardest hit by the breach in the levees, to lay practically 
untouched since the storm. 197 In addition, the public sector was slow to recover, if at all. 
The public hospital was never reopened, public schools were slow to reopen, and the 
most public housing looks as though it will never reopen. 198 These developments have 
infuriated many in the African American community, accusing the government of 
opportunistic neo-liberalism and "ethnic cleansing.,,199 Before the storm, New Orleans 
195 "Superdome Evacuation Completed," msnbc.com, 3 September 2005, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/idl9175611. 
196 ACLU, National Prison Project, Abandoned and Abused: Orleans Parish Prison in the Wake of 
Hurricane Katrina, 
197 Brad Heath, "For New Orleans after Katrina, too many nights remain silent," USA Today, 21 Dec 2006, 
www.usatoday.com/news/nationl2006-12-20-new-orleans-rebuildinLx.htm. 
198 Jordan Flaherty, "Privatizing New Orleans," Left Turn, 28 Jan 2006, leftturn.org/?q=nodel617. 
199 Naomi Klein, "This is turning into the ethnic cleansing of New Orleans," Guardian Unlimited, 24 
September 2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentistory/0,.1577324.00.html; Ghali Hassan, "Ethnic 
Cleansing in New Orleans", Global Research, 25 June 2006, 
http://www.globairesearch.calindex.php?context=viewArticle&code=HAS20060625&articleId=2688. 
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was 67% African American-that number had shrunk to 35% a year after the 
hurricane.2oo 
3.2.2 Hurricane Katrina as a natural disaster and as a political atrocity 
In the first instance Hurricane Katrina was a natural disaster. However, to a 
significant extent the human loss and suffering that occurred was both preventable as 
well as exacerbated by human actions and by official measures and policies. The 
aftermath of Katrina involved significant human rights abuses. As opposed to holding 
people accountable for mistakes made during the storm, and abuses in the immediate 
aftermath of the storm, the trend has been to cover-up, or ignore, this abuse, and continue 
with policies which further the violation of the hurricane victims' rights. 
The natural disaster aspect of the event makes it difficult to separate human-
induced suffering from that of an unfortunate encounter with Mother Nature. It is clear 
nevertheless, that certain actions were taken by state officials, at every level of 
government, which directly violated the rights of those already suffering at the hands of 
the storm, exacerbating rather than offering help and relief in their horrendous 
circumstances. Such actions include Governor Blanco of Louisiana's issuing a shoot-to-
kill order of "hoodlums,,201, murders at the hands of police officers202, the Gretna Police 
Department armed prevention of people from exiting New Orleans via the Gretna 
Bridge203, the inhumane treatment of inmates of the Orleans Parish Prison204, amongst a 
plethora of other abuses that occurred in the aftermath of the storm. Complicating matters 
are the neglect of responsibilities and inactions by the authorities before, during and after 
the storm which significantly added to the extent of death and destruction wrought by 
200 "Press Release: International Commission ofInquiry Concludes Fact-Finding Trip to Gulf Coast and 
Calls on the World Community to Build the International Tribunal on Hurricane Katrina," 
http://www . peopleshurricane.org/tribunal. 
201 "Troops told 'shoot to kill' in New Orleans," ABC News Online, 2 September 2005, 
http://www.abc.net.auinews/newsitems/200509/s1451906.htm. 
202 "New Orleans officers charged with Murder," MSNBC, 28 Dec 2006, 
www.msnbc.msn.comiidI163835391; People's Hurricane Relief Fund, They Left Us Here to Die, (2006), 
15. 
203 "Racism, resources blamed for bridge incident," CNNcom, 13 September 2005, 
http://www.cnn.coml2005IUS/09113/katrina.bridge/ . 
204 ACLU, National Prison Project, Abandoned and Abused, 
www.aclu.org/prison/conditions/26198res20060809.html. 
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natural forces. For example, the breaching of the levees in the aftermath of the storm in 
New Orleans was both predicted and preventable.205 Similarly, the evacuation plan of 
New Orleans relied on cars when in practice one third of the city's population did not 
have access to private transportation206. What looked like many peoples' choice to remain 
in the city, was in fact not a choice. In addition, fingers have been pointed at the federal 
government with their slow and inefficient response to the storm, which resulted in 
people being stranded for days in New Orleans with no food or water, and led to many 
avoidable deaths. 
Subsequent to the storm as well, the survivors of Hurricane Katrina faced a 
plethora of abuses and violations of their rights. For example, people were held in prison 
well beyond their release date207, survivors were issued trailers with high levels of 
formaldehyde208, private homes were bulldozed without due notice209, the aid dispersal 
program was slow, tedious and inadequate,210 and survivors of the storm were evicted 
from public housing units, which subsequent legislation mandated for destruction.2l1 
In the context of Hurricane Katrina, the natural disaster aspect of the hurricane 
was compounded by these human rights abuses. Exacerbating the issue is the fact that 
most of the survivors of Hurricane Katrina who were left in the city and who were the 
victims of these human rights abuses, were African Americans, casing the aftermath of 
Katrina in the familiar narrative of racial polarization. In this context, a process to 
establish the "truth about Katrina" would require, not just a scientific investigation into 
205 Susan B Glasser and Michael Grunwald. "Experts Say Faultee Levees Caused Much of the Flooding." 
WashingtonPost.com, 21 September 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.comiwp-
dynl content/arti c1e/2005109/20! AR200509200 1 894.html. 
206 Laura Butterbaugh, "Why did Hurricane Katrina Hit Women So Hard?" Off Our Backs 35 (2005): 18. 
207 "Critical Resistance Fact Sheet What We Know: The Status of Prisoners and Policing Post Katrina," 
Critical Resistance, 11 November 2005, www.criticalresistance.org/katrina/postkatrinastatus.html. 
208 Mike Bruckner, "Are FEMA trailers 'toxic tin cans'?" msnbc, 25 July 2006, 
www.msnbc.msn.comlid/14011193/fromlED. 
209 Stephen Bradberry and Jeffrey Buchanan, "Katrina's Bulldozer Politics," TomPaine.com, 23 August 
2006, www.tompaine.comlarticles/2006/08/23/katrinas_ bulldozer ---'politics.php. 
210 Eric Lipton and Jennifer Steinhauer, "FEMA, Slow to the Rescue, Now Stumbles in Aid Effort," NY 
Times, 17 September 2005, 
www.nytimes.coml2005109117 Inational/nationalspeciaI117fema.html? J= 1 &oref=slogin ; "Louisiana Slow 
to Distribute Aid from FEMA," washingtonpost.com, 20 December 2006, www.washingtonpost.comlwp-
dynlcontent/articlel20061121191 AP2006121901275. 
211 Jenny Jarvie, "Fury in New Orleans as housing demolition OK'd," Los Angeles Times, 21 December 
2007, www.latimes.comlnews/printeditionlasectionlla-na-neworleans21 dec21, 1,1,73 86395.story?coll=la-
news-a section&ctrack= 1 &cset=true. 
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the underlying natural causes and consequences of the stonn, or a commission of enquiry 
into the extent of planning and policy failures on the part of responsible authorities, but 
rather an official or unofficial truth process concerned with breaking the silence and 
denial, to establish accountability for the perpetrators of the human rights abuses, and to 
acknowledge the suffering of the victims. Inevitably, the goals of the process would also 
include bringing about changes to contemporary practices that continue to violate the 
rights of survivors, as survivors are still mired in the after-effects of the disaster. 
3.2.3 The aftermath of Katrina and the Greensboro Massacre 
Several comparisons can be drawn between the way in which events unfolded in 
the two cases of the Greensboro Massacre and the New Orleans aftennath of Katrina. The 
Greensboro Massacre was a single traumatic incident on a particular date and place. In 
contrast the many and dispersed incidents violence that ensued in the aftennath of 
Katrina took place in a context of confusion and chaos. People were randomly dispersed, 
often losing contact with friends and relatives. Individuals from the same families or 
neighbourhoods often found themselves forced to board different busses heading to 
different cities, breaking up local communities and forcing families apart.212 Police who 
used force and violence in these chaotic conditions were not so much targeting specific 
individuals as political opponents with explicit orders, as in the context of political 
disappearances. It is very possible that in many cases police had no idea who they were 
interacting with in the context of Katrina. Also, in retrospect, it is harder to focus on the 
"disappearances" of friends and family as a detenninate phenomenon. It is always a 
possibility that if a relative has disappeared, a number of other explanations are plausible 
besides brutality-related death, for example that the person is alive in another city and 
unable to be located, or the person died in the flood of natural causes and was just not 
found. Even people who claim to have witnessed a police officer shoot a person213 would 
212 People's Hurricane ReiiefFund (PHRF) and International Liason Committee, They Left Us Here To Die 
(2006),15. 
213 Ibid., 15. 
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be unlikely to be able identify the victim, or who the officer was who was doing the 
shooting. 
But secondly, in both the Greensboro Massacre and in the aftermath of Katrina, 
law enforcement officials were either directly involved or complicit in the abuse of poor 
and African American citizens or their allies. Especially in the context of Hurricane 
Katrina, the racialized nature of the events which took place cannot be underestimated; a 
framework of race and socioeconomic status became the platform on which the activists 
responding to abuse by the government have based their arguments. It is without question 
that the majority of the survivors left inside New Orleans during Katrina were African 
American and poor. Therefore, the slow response time, the inadequate relief efforts, the 
abusive treatment by the police, the racialized portrayal by the media, and the reluctance 
of the city of New Orleans to create conditions conducive for poor, black residents to 
return, lead many to the conclusion that underlying official racism played a major part in 
the disastrous aftermath of Katrina. As mentioned earlier, before the storm, 67.9% of 
New Orleans' population was black. A year after the storm only 35% of the population 
was black.214 Indeed, many have come to believe that the authorities were doing 
everything within their power to prevent the black population of New Orleans from 
returning through such measures as delayed aid dispersal, the closure of public housing, 
the closing of the public hospital and the painstakingly slow reopening of public schools. 
Such trends have even led some to make accusations of "ethnic cleansing".215 
Thirdly, in both cases charges of human rights abuses have been met by official 
and public denial. For example, there have been no charges filed against the Gretna 
Police Department for blocking the bridge, or firing shots216, and all police officers 
charged with having shot and killed innocent people in New Orleans have yet to get a 
214 "Press Release: International Commission of Inquiry Concludes Fact-Finding Trip to Gulf Coast and 
Calls on the World Community to Build the International Tribunal on Hurricane Katrina," People's 
Hurricane Relief Fund, September 2006, http://www.peopleshurricane.org/tribunal. 
215 Naomi Klein, "This is turning into the ethnic cleansing of New Orleans," Guardian Unlimited, 24 
September 2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0 .. 1577324.00.html; Ghali Hassan, "Ethnic 
Cleansing in New Orleans", Global Research, 25 June 2006, 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=HAS20060625&articleId=2688. 
216 Michael Kunzelman, "No Charges in Katrina Blockade," ABC News, 31 October 2007, 
www.wjla.com/news/stories/1 007/468556.html. 
62 
University of Cape Town
tria1.217 Sheriff Gusman denies that any deaths occurred within Orleans Parish Prison at 
all.218 Also, a federal judge has absolved the Army Corps of Engineers for their failure to 
maintain the levees in an attempted liability SUit.219 In both cases, in Greensboro, NC and 
New Orleans, failures to prosecute as well as acquittals, reinforce public silence and 
denial that any human rights abuses took place. In both cases, racism and official cover-
ups operated hand-in-hand in creating an environment of impunity for abusive police 
officers. Thirdly, portrayal in the media of both events was biased and racist, effectively 
representing victims of the Massacre as radical instigators and black victims of Hurricane 
Katrina as culpable of looting and acts of violence. From the standpoint of the victims 
there is thus a need for a truth process to establish the human rights abuses that actually 
occurred in the aftermath of both events in the eyes of the public, both in the community 
and in the nation22o• And if an official truth process is not feasible, then an unofficial 
community-based truth process may be initiated. Joya Wesley of the Greensboro Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission has pointed to the analogies between that unofficial truth 
process and the impact of Hurricane Katrina. She argued that in the case of Katrina as 
well, the question of 'What does the past have to do with the present and future?' may 
serve as a valuable lens for viewing underlying issues such as race, economics, power 
and law enforcement.221 
3.2.4 Comparing the conditions for unofficial truth processes after Katrina and in 
Greensboro 
It is thus not surprising that in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, as in the 
sequence of the Greensboro Massacre, citizens have joined together to initiate unofficial 
truth processes, albeit under different circumstances and with different goals in mind. In 
the case of New Orleans two groups of citizens have established truth-seeking processes 
217 "Still no trial for police charged in killing," wdsu.com, 2 January 2008, 
www.wdsu.comlnewsI14960775/detail.html. 
218 ACLU, Abandoned and Abused, 62. 
219 Adam Nossiter, "In Court Ruling on Floods, More Pain for New Orleans," The New York Times, 1 Feb 
2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/02/0 l/us/O 1 corps.html. 
220 Caruthers and Jackson, ed., The Breach: Bearing Witness, (4 June 2007): 45; Greensboro Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, Final Report, 324-338. 
221 Joya Wesley, "Mayor Pro Tern, Author to Speak at Final Truth Commission Hearing." 
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to illuminate the events during and after Hurricane Katrina: the National Katrina Justice 
Commission sponsored and run by the Samuel Proctor DeWitt Conference, and the 
International Tribunal on Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, put on by the People's Hurricane 
Relief Fund. 
Before discussing these two truth projects, it is important to point to a number of 
context-specific issues in regards to truth-seeking in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, 
which differentiate this from the Greensboro TRC process. For one, the time distance 
from the actual traumatic event for Greensboro was about 25 years, while it had only 
been 1-2 years since Hurricane Katrina. Such a close time proximity means that those 
conducting the truth-process in the context of Katrina are often still deeply involved in 
the issues which are being addressed. In Greensboro, the process of remembering what 
occurred happened in a spirit of community healing and reconciliation. In addition to 
remembering as a way of seeking healing, as those in Greensboro sought to do, the truth 
initiatives in New Orleans have sought to illuminate not only the wrongs of the past, but 
even more what is still going wrong, and as a means of calling for immediate action on 
the part of the authorities in ongoing political processes. 
Another challenge faced in truth-seeking in the context of Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita, is complexity of shared accountability in the devastation. The poor evacuation 
planning, the poor response and relief effort, the police and National Guard abuse and the 
inefficiency of the post-disaster aid-dispersal bureaucracy all stem from different power 
centers within the "government": local government and police force, state government, 
and the federal government and National Guard. Therefore, discerning accountability and 
calling for reforms must necessarily take on all levels of government simultaneously. 
This aspect of joint responsibility not only translates into a difficulty in determining 
accountability, but also allows different powers-that-be to be free of taking responsibility 
to rectify these issues. The bureaucratic ladder of divvied up responsibility also affects 
the dynamics as far as prospects for eventual community reconciliation is concerned. 
Thirdly, while in Greensboro the hearings were located in a specific location with 
a concentrated and manageable number of community members called to testify, in the 
case of Katrina any process of holding public hearings enabling victims to tell their 
stories of human rights abuses would be much more difficult to carry out. Hurricane 
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victims have been scattered far and wide across the country; there is no feasible system to 
locate them, and they dwarf Greenboro victims in terms of sheer number. The 
government itself already faces difficulty with locating survivors to provide information 
regarding FEMA policies and aid dispersal.222 Even just to communicate to people that a 
truth process is proposed would require extensive media outreach, not to mention the fact 
that public hearings would need to be held in multiple stories in order to reach most of 
the survivors. This sets the process of truth-seeking in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina 
in a whole different strategic field than in the context of Greensboro. 
3.3 Unofficial truth initiatives in the aftermath of Katrina 
This section will examine two grassroots community truth-seeking initiatives that 
have taken place recently in response to the events surrounding Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita: the National Katrina Justice Commission and the International Tribunal on 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. (Rita was a hurricane that struck a few weeks after Katrina 
causing further damage, albeit on a much smaller scale than Katrina). Both projects took 
place on a much smaller scale in comparison with the Greensboro Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, as each involved only a few days of public testimony by a 
select few representative people to illustrate points. However, they may be instructively 
compared with other unofficial truth processes in transitional justice contexts concerned 
with community reconciliation: as they are processes that value public testimony, 
emphasize giving victims a voice, overcome popular interpretations of events by 
exposing stories contrary to what the media has reported, determine accountability and 
issue recommendations. 
222 "Problems with FEMA data left Housing and Urban Development workers searching for 25% of 
hurricane survivors eligible for a rental assistance program," Community Settlement Network, 2 December 
2007, http;llwww.houstonhurricanerecovery.org/show content articie.asp?id=l ?22007-
112621&categon=nola%20news. 
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3.3.1 The National Katrina Justice Commission: Its Composition, Function and 
Hearings 
The Samuel DeWitt Proctor Conference, Inc. (SDPC) is a nation-wide consortium 
of African American pastors, clergy, laypersons and seminarians committed to social 
justice. A conference is held every year at which hundreds of African American church 
leaders meet to take part in workshops and lectures?23 According to Dr. Iva Caruthers, 
the secretary general of the SPDC, the SPDC is "committed to strengthening the internal 
capacity of African American congregations to enable them to engage in fruitful and 
strategic social justice ministries.,,224 The SDPC leadership was brought to the table in 
conversations with twelve congressman in the aftermath of Katrina. Dr. Iva Caruthers, 
the General Secretary of the SPDC, was invited along with nine other African American 
faith leaders to participate in a discussion on September 20, 2005, initiated by the 
Honourables James Clyborn and Nancy Pelosi, to talk with a representative group of 
Democrats (six Senators and six Representatives) to discuss the government's response to 
Hurricane Katrina. According to Caruthers, at that meeting it became clear that the 
Congress-based initiative would not be sufficient to secure speedy recovery for the Gulf 
Coast. In addition, it was made clear that the White House opposed an independent 
Katrina Commission (like the 9111 commission), and that the House Bipartisan 
Committee, was the opposite ofbipartisan.225 According to Caruthers, the House 
Bipartisan Committee was a "farce" as only Republicans had subpoena power.226 
It was after this meeting that Caruthers came up with the idea for an independent 
commission initiated by the Black church to look into the response and recovery efforts 
after Katrina.227 The organizing body for the Samuel De Witt Proctor Conference called 
223 "Who We Represent," Samuel DeWitt Proctor Conference, Inc, 2006, 
http://wv..rw.sdpconference.info/aboutus/represent.html. 
224 "About Us," Samuel DeWitt Proctor Conference, Inc, 2006, http://www.sdpconference.info/aboutus/ 
225 Caruthers and Jackson, ed., The Breach, 3 
226 Ida Caruthers, "Roundtable: Religion's Response to Katrina" [Audiorecording], NPR's News and Notes 
with Ed Gordon, 25 September 2005, NPR, 
http://www .npr.org/templates! story! story. php ?storyId=4860629. 
227 Caruthers and Jackson, ed., The Breach, 3 
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together leaders from churches across the country to serve as commissioners on a 
"Katrina National Justice Commission." 
Unlike the GTRC the primary purpose of this Commission was not that of 
addressing the human rights abuses thereby to achieve community reconciliation Rather, 
the Commission was formed in an effort to serve as a unique platform from which to 
lobby for more effective relief measures as needed in the aftermath of Katrina, that being 
from the platform of a coalition of African American churches. This platform was seen as 
a benefit in both its ability to reach out to storm survivors, as well as a platform from 
which political influence could be exerted. The SPDC claimed that, as 63 % of African 
American parishioners considered their pastors to be the most important leaders in their 
community, a commission run by African American church leaders would bring a largely 
untapped voice into play.228 Reverend Otis Moss III, a pastor and a Proctor conference 
trustee is quoted as saying, "We felt that African-American churches connect with people 
that the government would miss or ignore. ,,229 The prestige of the SPDC also carried 
political weight by virtue of the connections and respect for concerns for African 
American church leaders. For example, the SPDC "took part in several major 
congressional briefings and secured significant grants to support African-American 
churches in Baton Rouge, Houston and Chicago.,,23o In addition, the SPDC partnered 
with the Congressional Black Caucus, as well as other individual members of congress, 
which gave them an "in" to the political process.231 
The rhetoric surrounding the Commission did include calls for restoration, healing 
and the need for people to tell their stories. It posited the public hearing process as a way 
to respect and remember those who perished or suffered in the storm. For example, Dr. 
Iva Caruthers said of the Commission, ""This commission creates a forum for 
remembrance, restoration, and healing for individuals and communities whose vitality 
228 "African American Ministers Conference Scrutinizes Katrina Response from Unique Perspective," Faith 
in Public Life, www.faithinpublic1ife.org/content/case-studies/proctro _ conference.html. 
229 Jane Lampman, "To Raise New Orleans, lift churches, pastors urge," The Christian Science Monitor, 24 
August 2006, http://www.csmonitor.comI2006/0824/pl 7 sO l-lire.html. 
230 "African American Ministers Conference Scrutinizes Katrina Response from Unique Perspective," Faith 
in Public Life, www.faithinpublic1ife.org/contentlcase-studies/proctro _ conference.html. 
231 Ibid., 1. 
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and future represent the possibility for all of America. ,,232 However, at the same time, the 
Commission was evidently invoking these notions of remembrance, restoration and 
healing primarily for instrumental purposes, and not for their own sake. Members of the 
SPDC pointed out the fact that they wanted to highlight people's stories emphasizing the 
suffering that was ongoing in the Gulf Coast in order to keep Hurricane Katrina relief at 
the front of the national agenda. While documenting the stories of past suffering and 
abuse for their own sake was deemed important, a big part of the testimony process was 
in order to lobby for political action and so to alleviate the ongoing suffering. Reverend 
Jeremiah Wright, a founder of the SPDC, said that the Commission wanted to "nudge the 
American conscience" through documenting individual stories of hurricane survivors. 233 
A board member of the SPDC, Reverend Susan Smith said that, "people are still 
suffering, people still don't know where their relatives are, and the devastation, its still 
there. Neighborhoods haven't been cleaned up; people are still being found dead. We 
don't want Katrina forgotten as we move on to new issues and new concems.,,234 
In the introduction to the final report, the executive summary posits the Katrina 
National Justice Commission as a forum through which the African American 
community was able to share their side of the story regarding what happened in the 
events surrounding Hurricane Katrina. Although not explicitly placed in terms of 
reconciliation, the project was as a process of "remembrance, renewal and solidarity," 
with church services carried out across the nation on the anniversary of the hurricane, as 
audio recordings of the hearings were made available to the public.235 Also according to 
the executive summary, as part of the commission's goals and purpose, the commission 
was "charged with making recommendations to government officials, at all levels, as well 
as to non-profit disaster relief organizations and African American churches and 
community-based organizations concerning both the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and 
future disasters in our communities. ,,236 These instrumental lobbying functions, rather 
m Ibid., 1. 
233 Bruce Alpert, "Groups to tell stories of storm victims," Times-Picayune, 14 June 2006, nola. com, 
www.nola.com!news/t-p/washingtonJindex.ssf?lbase-1 1115026571446390.xml&coll= 1. 
234 Ibid., 1. 
235 Caruthers and Jackson, ed., The Breach, 4. 
236 Ibid., 10. 
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than any constitutive process of community reconciliation, informed the Commission and 
its public hearings. 
The commission was composed of 29 leaders in the African American 
community. Reverend Dr. Susan K. Smith served as the Commission chair.237 The 
makeup of the commission may have contributed to an ethos of trust from African 
American testifiers, in light of the trust indicated in the African American church, as well 
as belonging to a similar racial group. However, the homogenous makeup of the 
commission also demonstrates that inclusiveness as an objective was not prioritized, as it 
had been during the GTRC process. While this may have allowed the commission to 
represent "voice of the African American community," this factor could also contribute 
to the process being written off as one-sided. 
The commission held three sessions of public hearings in three different US cities: 
Washington DC, New Orleans and Houston. The first round of hearings took place on 
June 15-16,2006 at the Lutheran Church of Reformation in Washington DC. The second 
round of public hearings took place June 29-30,2006 at the Sheraton Hotel in New 
Orleans, LA. Finally, the third round of public hearings took place July 27-28,2006 at 
the Wheeler Avenue Baptist Church in Houston, TX. 
The commissioners heard a total of 57 testimonies.238 The people called before 
the commission included multiple representatives from non-profit organizations, elected 
officials, church representatives from churches in New Orleans and Houston, and storm 
survivors. Included in the lineup of those who testified were: Senator Hilary Rodham 
Clinton, as well as Representative William Jefferson of Louisiana. Representatives the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Red Cross.239 General Russel 
Honore, from the Army's Katrina Joint Task Force, testified before the commission in a 
private hearing.24o 
237 Ibid." 6-7. 
238 Ibid., 4. 
239 Alpert, Bruce, "Groups to tell stories of stonn victims;" SDPC, The Breach, 73-4. 
240 Caruthers and Jackson, ed., The Breach, 74. 
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3.3.1.1 The Final Report of the Katrina Justice Commission 
The final report of the National Katrina Justice Commission is entitled The 
Breach: Bearing Witness. The report is written from an overtly Christian perspective, as 
the perspective of the Black Church, referring in the text to supporting scriptures from the 
Bible.241 The report grounds itself within this religious context, "A sermon is not an 
event. A report is more than the writing and a tragedy is more than the outcomes. 
Underneath each one is a process-a journey towards the telling of the story-God' s 
story, a people's story, and a personal story. And so it is with The Breach: Bearing 
Witness. ,,242 
Following the introduction, the report is broken down into the foundational 
recommendations of the report, and then four categories of more detailed 
recommendations: 1) Disaster and ReliefIssues; 2) Restoration Issues; 3) Public Policy 
Issues; 4) African American Church and Community-based Organizations Preparedness. 
The report is not a truth report, per se, in that it does not go into a detailed blow-by-blow 
account regarding events surrounding the storm. Rather, it is a laundry list of 
recommendations made by the commission, along with excerpts from the transcripts of 
the public testimony hearings that support these recommendations, and the context 
behind such a recommendations. 
Although, because of time and resource limitations given to the commission, a 
comprehensive "truth" report, or thorough documentation of events, was not feasible, the 
commission dealt with this challenge by including in their recommendations a call for 
further inquiry into issues that came up in relation to the storm. The documentation of 
human rights abuse is integrated in the report though a recommendation made. For 
example, Recommendation 1.5 calls on the government ''to investigate issues around 
vigilante activity and police treatment and arrests after Hurricane Katrina. The findings 
241 Ibid., 5. 
242 Ibid., 1. 
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must be made public and violators brought to justice." 243 The report then includes a 
background context for this recommendation, including excerpts from testimonies that 
refer to such vigilante groups, and a testimony from the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) who had represented over 17 people who 
were detained on ''bogus'' charges.244 The report also recommends an inquiry into the 
racist portrayal of black survivors in the aftermath of the storm in the media.245 
The three foundational recommendations are the following: 
• For a Federal Hurricane Victims Fund to be established and HR 4197246 to be 
passed to deal with the myriad of concerns and issues still facing victims of the 
hurricane; 
• African American church and community-based organizations must be 
represented at every level of the national disaster relief planning tables; 
• An independent, bipartisan fully empowered Congressional Commission, as 
outlined in Senate Bill 1748 is established and supported. 
Beyond these foundational recommendations, 21 additional recommendations are 
outlined. The report covers such a wide range of issues that all it is able to do is to skim 
the surface of the issues, including a small paragraph with references to one or two 
testimonies. 
The range of recommendations made in the final report is great, as the large range 
of issues associated with Katrina exists. Restorative symbolic measures, such as 
remembering the stories of survivors in a spirit of "lest we forget, ,,247 keeping the date of 
August 27th as a sacred day of remembrance248, proposing the establishment of a fund to 
support the preservation of black culture in New Orleans,249 and constructing memorial 
243 Ibid., 16. 
244 Ibid., 34. 
245 Ibid., 45. 
246 HR 4197 was never passed. It was cleared off the books at the end of the Congressional session. 
See, "HR 4197 [l09th): Hurricane Katrina Recovery, Reclamation, Restoration, Reconstruction and 
Reunion Act of 2005", GovTrack.us, www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-4197. 
247 Caruthers and Jackson, ed., The Breach, 23 
248 Ibid., 57. 
249 Ibid., 51. 
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sites250 are included in the recommendations. However, many of the recommendations 
remain related to emergency preparedness and policy, such as recommendations to 
implement a national database locator system, to enable family members to locate each 
other in the event of an emergency51, as well as recommendations for FEMA to 
coordinate its emergency plans with state and local officials across the nation.252 
The report, "The Breach: Bearing Witness" was presented at the 36th Legislative 
Conference of the Congressional Black Caucus Foundation Weekend.253 The report is 
available for free online on the SPDC website.254 The transcripts of testimony, which add 
up to over 1000 pages, are made available for public record.255 
3.3.1.2 Critical Assessment of the Katrina Justice Commission: Acknowledgment, 
Legitimacy, Funding and the Media 
The National Katrina Justice Commission is not the fIrst unofficial truth process 
to be initiated by a religious community. In Brazil: Nunca Mas, the key fIgures were a 
Bishop and the Catholic Church256; the Catholic Church also initiated Guatemala's 
Proyecto de Recuperacion de fa Memoria Historica (Recovery of Historical Memory 
Project).257 In Guatemala, the involvement of the church was seen as giving the project 
autonomy and objectivity: "As a church, our position is autonomous. As a result, our 
investigation will be impartial.,,258 The question is to what extent the prominent role of 
the Black Church in the case of the Katrina National Justice Commission contributed to 
the legitimacy of the Commission. 
In as far as the Commission represented the Black Church, it functioned as a 
voice for the African American community at large. The majority of Hurricane Katrina 
victims were African Americans so that the Black Church's pastoral concern with their 
250 Ibid., 57. 
251 Ibid., 34. 
252 Ibid., 25. 
253 Ibid., 4. 
254 Samuel DeWitt Conference, Inc, http;llwww.sdpconference.info. 
255 Caruthers and Jackson, ed., The Breach, 4. 
256 Bickford, "Unofficial Truth Projects," 1006. 
257 Ibid., 1009. 
258 Cited in Bickford, "Unofficial Truth Projects," 1010. 
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plight needs no special explanation. The acknowledgment that took place retained an 
element of self-determination, in that African Americans themselves took the initiative in 
a process seeking acknowledgement for victims, rather than relying on the state or 
official bodies for such acknowledgement. Following the Commission, a resolution and 
worship litany were released for churches around the country to include as materials in 
their church services on the first anniversary of the hurricane, August 27,2006. The 
resolution and litany were to be included in church services at hundreds of churches 
around the country in a spirit of "remembrance, renewal and solidarity.,,259 
The Katrina National Justice Commission achieved a measure of wider legitimacy 
through the general respect for the Black Church as a body, and also from support by 
prominent public groups, especially the Congressional Black Caucus.260 The commission 
was also endorsed by Senator Barack Obama. Testimony by high profile political figures, 
Senator Hilary Rodham Clinton and Mr. Robert Shea, the Acting Director of Operations 
of FEMA, at the public hearings organized by the Commission also contributed to the 
perceived legitimacy of the Commission as well as to its media visibility. However, 
despite the presence of such "high profile" figures contributing testimony, media 
coverage of the Commission and its public hearings was not substantial, compared to the 
GTRC. The Commission did gain coverage in the New Orleans Times-Picayune in an 
article entitled, "Group to tell stories of storm victims.,,261 
The Samuel De Witt Proctor Conference staged a commission that, because of the 
respect allocated to the Black Church, was able to achieve audience with impressive 
governmental figures. As a part of the African American community, and held in high 
regard at that, the Commission represented self-determination, a voice advocating for 
"one's own". The limited amount of time allocated to the process did not allow for 
enough time to carry out thorough investigations. As such, the Commission primarily 
sought to achieve certain goals, through issuing the government recommendations. 
Beyond this aspect, there was however, a level of the process dedicated to remembrance 
and memorializing. 
259 Caruthers and Jackson, ed., The Breach, 4 
260 "African American Ministers Conference Scrutinizes Katrina Response from Unique Perspective," Faith 
in Public Life, http://www .faithinpubliclife.org/contentlcase-studies/proctor conference.html. 
261 Bruce Alpert, "Groups to tell stories of storm victims." -
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3.3.2 The International Tribunal on Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
A different group of grassroots activists, located on the political left, compiled an 
alternative truth process in response to the events surrounding Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita: the International Tribunal on Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The slogan of the 
tribunal was "Truth Crushed to the Earth will Rise!" The truth process modeled itself on 
that of a criminal tribunal and "put the American government on trial.,,262 Included in the 
process were: a group of "conveners"; a panel of "judges" composed of individuals from 
organizations around the world; and a team of "prosecutors," various lawyers, both local 
and international, who presented arguments to the tribunal in regards to a list of charges 
against the US government as a whole. It also provided opportunities to individual 
survivors to give public testimony in support of these charges. Though the process was 
designed as a criminal proceeding, the element of having hurricane victims' stories told 
was still a dominant theme in the rhetoric of the process. 
The People's Hurricane Relief Fund and Oversight Coalition (PHRF) was formed 
in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Composed of a coalition of 45 different 
grassroots organizations in the Gulf Coast region affected by the hurricanes, the PHRF 
was formed in order to provide a forum for the voices of hurricane victims in the 
reconstruction of the Gulf Coast, and in order to oversee relief and reconstruction efforts. 
According to the PHRF, ''the people of New Orleans will not go quietly into the night, 
scattering across this country to become homeless in countless other cities while federal 
relief funds are funneled into rebuilding casinos, hotels, chemical plants and the wealthy 
white districts of New Orleans like the French Quarter and the Garden District.,,263 
The idea to hold a symbolic tribunal was born out of the First Survivors 
Assembly, which was a gathering of hundreds of displaced hurricane survivors from 
across the country in Jackson, Mississippi on December 8th and 9th, 2005. A coalition of 
the PHRF, the Mississippi Disaster Relief Coalition (MS-DRC), the Black Activists 
Coalition on Katrina, among some other 50 partner organizations, organized the event.264 
262 International Tribunal on Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, www.internationaitribunal.org. 
263 LeiLani Dowell, "Survivors Demand People's Control," Published on Worker's World, 22 September 
2005, People's Hurricane Relief Fund Blog, ciuonline.live.radicaldesigns.orgl?page id=37. 
~ -
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The Survivors Assembly was "convened as a democratic institution to provide survivors 
with a vehicle for self determination. ,,265 At this event, the survivors drafted a People's 
Declaration, which listed the demands that hurricane victims were making on the 
government. The People's Declaration included demands for the establishment ofa 
Victims' Compensation Fund, public work for displaced residents, as well as 
transparency in the reconstruction process.266 500 delegates at the Survivor's Assembly 
made the decision to convene an International Tribunal on Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita.267 Following the Survivor's Assembly, on December 10, 2005, over 2,000 survivors 
and supporters marched on City Hall (according to one report by the PHRF over 5,000 
people were in attendance), to demand their right to return with dignity to their homes 
and communities.268 People at the march held signs saying, "FEMA is Racist," and 
"Black Holocaust" as they shouted "We're Back!,,269 
While the idea of a tribunal originated within the local community and survivor 
groups, the process soon developed a notably international character. A year before the 
tribunal was scheduled to take place, a group of four activists from countries other than 
the United States made a trip to New Orleans. Their stated objective was specifically to 
do preliminary investigations as to human rights abuses being carried out against the 
people of New Orleans and other cities across the Gulf Coast.270 In effect they formed an 
unofficial commission of inquiry, even terming themselves the International Commission 
of Inquiry (lCI), into the human rights abuses associated with the aftermath of Katrina. In 
addition to conducting preliminary research, the commission was put together in order to 
build support, both local and international, for the "tribunal" which was to come a year 
later. The commission was organized by the PHRF alongside the Black Activist Coalition 
on Katrina and the International Liaison Committee for a Workers Internationa1.271 The 
four members of the ICI were activists from four different countries: Edenice Santana de 
265 "Background," International Tribunal on Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, 
htlp:llinternationaltribunal.orgltribunal-background. 
266 Jesse Mohammed, "From Outrage to Action," in PHRF and ICI, They Left Us Here to Die, 7. 
267 "Press Release: International Commission ofInquiry Concludes Fact-Finding Trip to Gulf Coast and 
Calls on the World Community to Build the International Tribunal on Hurricane Katrina," People's 
Hurricane Relief Fund, http://www.peopleshurricane.org/tribunal. 
268 PHRF and ICI, They Left Us Here to Die, 2 
269 Mohammed, Jesse, "From Outrage to Action," in PHRF and ICI, They Left Us Here to Die, 6 
270 PHRF and ICI, They Left Us Here to Die. 
271 Ibid., 12. 
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Jesus, an activist from Brazil, who was a member of the Unified Black Movement 
(Movimento Negro Unificado) and the Central Workers Union Confederation (Central 
Unica dos Trabalhadores); Jesus "Chucho" Garcia from Venezuela who was the founder 
of the Afro-Venezuelan Network; Lybon Mabasa from South Africa who was a veteran 
of the Black Conciousness Network and President of the Socialist Party of Azania; and 
Sammy Hayon, an Egyptian architect and trade unionist based in France.272 The ICI spent 
seven days in New Orleans and other cities along the Gulf Coast. The group conducted 
interviews with survivors and grassroots organization representatives, toured the 
devastated neighborhoods, met with public officials, and observed one-year 
commemoration activities.273 
After seven days of touring and interviews, the ICI compiled a report entitled 
They Left Us Here to Die. Included in the report is a compilation of various articles, 
statistics, excerpts and summaries of many testimonies offered by survivors of the 
hurricane. The report also contained an article on the Survivor's Assembly, a copy of the 
People's Platform (a list of demands compiled by the PHRF compiled by survivors who 
participated in the PHRF Survivor's Assembly), excerpts from multiple interviews in 
both New Orleans and Biloxi, Mississippi and finally a brief summary of human rights 
violations by the government. The document served as a basis from which preliminary 
issues were outlined in order to argue for a further process to take place, that being the 
International Tribunal on Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.274 In a sense, the involvement of 
this body can be compared to the National Advisory Committee of the GTRC, in that it 
was a body of internationally respected persons charged with generating wider national 
and international support for a process which was to come. 
The International Tribunal itself took place between August 29-September 2, 
2007, on the two-year anniversary of the storm. A number of charges were laid against 
the US government, with complaints lodged at all levels, local, state and federal. 
Evidence was then presented and public testimony heard from survivors. Of the five 
days, three were given to public hearings, one day for the ''judges'' to deliberate, and one 
day in which to tour New Orleans. Kali Akuno, the executive director of the PHRF 
272 Ibid., 12. 
273 Ibid., 12. 
274 Ibid., 12. 
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compared the influence and inspiration for the International Tribunal with the 1993 
International Tribunal on Hawaiian sovereignty,275 the 1984 Permanent Peoples Tribunal 
on Nicaragua, and recent tribunals and human rights commissions on the impact of the 
Tsunami in various parts of Southeast Asia.276 For example, at the Hawaiian Tribunal, a 
similar process was carried out, "The tribunal drew on the systematic power of law to 
condemn the United States' treatment of Kanaka Maoli people by convicting the US 
government of a series of charges presented in terms of violations oflaw.,,277 
The objectives of the tribunal, outlined by Kali Akuno as executive director of the 
PHRF, were as follows: 
"1) To fully expose the world to the human rights abuses committed by 
the US government and its agencies in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita 
2) To attain national and international recognition as Internally Displaced 
Persons (IDP's) for all of the survivors of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
3) To attain comprehensive financial restitution and reparations for all the 
Gulf Coast IDP's (including migrant workers and communities) 
4) To strengthen the Gulf Coast Reconstruction Movement and a build 
broad national and international movement in support of its aims and 
demands 
5) To hold the rogue US government accountable for its human rights 
abuses and crimes against the Gulf Coast IDP's,,278 
The ''judges'' who participated in the tribunal consisted of 16 activists from 
around the world, most hailing from human rights activist organizations on the political 
left. Included on the panel was Jill Soffiyah Elijah, Deputy Director of the Criminal 
Justice Institute at Harvard Law School; Adjoa Ayietoro, a Professor of Law at the 
University of Arkansas and Co-Chair of the National Coalition of Blacks for Reparations 
275 The Ka Ho'okolokolonui Kanaka Maoli Tribunal was very similar in many aspects to the Katrina 
Tribunal, in that it held a symbolic trial for the US government and involved international allies. See, Sally 
Engle Merry, "Legal Pluralism and Transnational Culture: the Ka Ho'okolokolonui Kanaka Maoli 
Tribunal, Hawaii, 1993," in Human Rights, Culture & Context: Anthropological Perspectives, Richard A. 
Wilson, ed. London: Pluto Press (1997) 28-48. 
276 Kali Akuno, "People's Justice: the International Tribunal on Hurricanes Katrina and Rita," International 
Tribunal on Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, http://internationaltribunal.org/tribunal-news/peoples-justice-the-
international-tribunal-on-hurricanes-kat.html. 
277 Merry, "Legal Pluralism and Transnational Culture," 44. 
278 Akuno, "People's Justice." 
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in America; Milton Barbosa, the Director of International Relations for the Unified Black 
Movement from Brazil; Jose Candido, State Deputy from Sao Paulo, Workers Party of 
Brazil; Charlie Lendo, from Guadeloupe, who is on the executive board of the General 
Union of Guadeloupan Workers; Luis Vasquez Villalobos, from Mexico, the Co-Chair of 
the Independent Democratic Workers Party; and Julia Wright from France, who is a 
coordinator for the Friends and Family of Mumia AI-Jabal.279 
As discussed earlier, the composition of a truth panel, even more so in the case of 
unofficial truth processes than with official truth commissions, can contribute 
significantly to its legitimacy. The lop-sided makeup of the panel of 'judges" on the 
tribunal, with the majority coming from unions and workers' parties around the world, 
was evidently not intended to bolster its legitimacy in the wider local community or 
among the American public. Rather, such a makeup can be seen as an effort for to locate 
the tribunal alongside international labour and political ideological struggles, to express 
solidarity in what was seen to be part and partial of a wider movement. However, the 
presence of Julia Suffiyah Elijah, the Harvard academic who served on the panel with no 
overt political affiliations, as well as Charles Elloie, a New Orleans-based retired judge, 
may have added some legitimacy to the panel. 
Serving as the symbolic "prosecuting team" were 17 lawyers from a number of 
organizations throughout the country. Included on the team were lawyers from 
organizations such as the ACLU, the NAACP and the National Lawyer's Guild.28o The 
participation of a diverse array of lawyers from prestigious organizations may have added 
more legitimacy to the process. 
In addition to the judges and prosecutors, four conveners also took part in the 
tribunal. The conveners were Cynthia McKinney, a former Representative of Georgia, 
Tiyani Lybon Mabasa, the president of the Socialist Party of Azania, Louisa Hanoune, 
the Deputy of the National Assembly of Algeria and the President of the Worker's Party 
279 "Judges," International Tribunal on Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, internationaltribunal.orgijudges. 
280 "Prosecution Team," International Tribunal on Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, 
internationaltribunal.org/prosecution-team. 
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of Algeria, Charles Barron, a New York City Councilman, and Edenice Santana de Jesus, 
the Executive Director of the CUT Trade Union Federation.281 
Ten charges were made by hurricane survivors represented by the PHRF against 
the US government, which included charging the government with violating rights such 
as freedom from racial discrimination and the right to return as an IDP.282 In addition, the 
Tribunal accused the government of crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and even 
genocide?83 In practice, the public hearing schedule of each day was broken down into a 
number of categories, in order to cover all the angles of human rights abuse that the 
tribunal sought to expose. Categories covered in the public hearings included: Prisons 
and Prisoner's Rights, Police Brutality, Economic and Cultural Rights, Women's Rights, 
Aid Dispersal, Preparation and Levees, Environmental Racism, Children and Juvenile 
Rights, Housing and Development, Labor and Migrant Rights, Health and the Right to 
Life, Evacuation and Food Dispersal, Voting and Assembly Rights, Education, 
Indigenous Rights, and finally, closed with Military Occupation and Mercenaries. The 
third day was the day in which the judges had an opportunity to deliberate on what they 
had seen and heard. Finally on the last day, the judges presented their "preliminary 
findings".284 Jill Soffiyah Elijah was the "coordinating justice" for the Tribunal, and 
presented the preliminary findings. Elijah read, "It is our view that the US Government 
has committed crimes against humanity particularly in relation to its failure to maintain 
functional levees that should have protected the City of New Orleans from flooding ... it 
was the reckless disregard and, in some instances, negligence of the US government, the 
state of Louisiana and the city of New Orleans that created the devastation we continue to 
see today.,,285 
281 "Conveners' Statements," International Tribunal on Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, 
http://internationaltribunal.orgl conveners-statements. 
282 "Tribunal Charges," International Tribunal on Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, 
http://internationaltribunal.orgltribunal-charges/ 
283 "On Trial: The US Government and its officials-for crimes against humanity and genocide," 
International Tribunal on Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, Internationaltribunal.org/media-reports. Also See, 
Lumbumba, Closing Arguments 
284 "Tribunal Schedule," The Right of Return Wild, http://rightofreturn.pbwiki.com/Tribunal+schedule. 
28S"Press Statement: International tribunal Issues Preliminary Findings," International Tribunal on 
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Even though the tribunal was structured as a "criminal trial," the public hearings 
emphasized the importance of victims and survivors being given the opportunity to share 
their stories of suffering and human rights abuses. According to Kali Akuno, the lead 
organizer of the International Tribunal, there was a limit to how many people could 
testify in front of the tribunal because of time restraints. Therefore, it was only the 
"representative" stories that were invited to give public testimony, in order to present the 
most convincing case. Nevertheless, he stressed how important it was for everyone to be 
given the opportunity to voice his or her experiences.286 In order to achieve that, satellite 
PHRF offices across the country were actively collecting and recording survivors' 
testimonies. The National Black Lawyers' Association also participated in the testimony-
gathering effort throughout the country?87 Akuno stressed that "the main thing is that 
people know that there are people who are willing to listen, and who are willing to record 
their stories.,,288 Excerpts from some of those testimonies, which had been recorded by 
the PHRF office in New Orleans, were included in the report written by the ICr.289 
During the day, running at the same time as the public testimony hearings of the tribunal 
proceedings, affidavits from survivors were being presented in a separate venue?90 
In addition to giving voice to victims and survivors, the value of pursuing truth 
for truth's own sake was stressed. In his closing arguments, "chief prosecuting attorney" 
Chokwe Lumbumba of the PHRF elevated the exposure of truth as the way in which they 
will achieve their objectives:" "final victory requires a determination to find the truth, the 
will to recognize and to face the truth, and the courage to speak the truth.,,291 The process 
of exposing the truth functioned as a way in which victims themselves may redefine 
history for themselves in a public forum: "Finding space, speaking and living the truth 
demands that we make history. It is not just enough that we be victims of history. We 
286 Panel Discussion on the International Tribunal on Hurricanes Katrina and Rita [Audio recording], US 
Social Forum, 28 July 2007. 
287 "Commissioners from African diaspora come in solidarity to New Orleans," People's Hurricane Relief 
Fund, 3 September 2006, , http://www.peopleshurricane.org/news/commissioners-from-african-diaspora-
come-in-solidarity-to-new-orleans.html. 
288 Panel Discussion on the International Tribunal on Hurricanes Katrina and Rita [Audio recording], US 
Social Forum, 28 July 2007. 
289 PHRF and ICI, They Left us Here to Die, 14-20. 
290 "Tribunal Schedule," The Right of Return Wiki, http://rightofreturn.pbwiki.com/Tribunal+schedule 
291 Chokwe Lumumba, Closing Arguments: Who is Responsible for Ethnic Cleansing? [video recording], 
International Tribunal for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, www.internationaltribunal.org. 
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must be masters of our own destiny. Today we make new history. This chapter has 
already begun.,,292 In his speech he also pointed out how the tribunal was meant to be a 
safe-space for victims of the storm who may not feel comfortable in a courtroom in 
America where the general consensus is that the American justice system is inherently 
')aded and racist.,,293 The tribunal also sought to establish accountability in order to resist 
a culture of impunity and to forward a human rights culture. Lybon Mabasa, one of the 
Conveners, stressed that the struggle that the tribunal represented must be continued in 
order that "we ... save ourselves from sinking into barbarism.,,294 
3.3.2.1Critical Assessment of the International Tribunal: Legitimacy, Funding and 
the Media 
Perhaps the biggest challenge to the Tribunal's legitimacy was the overt political 
orientation of the entire process. The origin of funding (which I will explain 
subsequently), the ideological orientation of the ')udges", as well as the rhetoric 
surrounding the tribunal allowed the process to be written off by the mainstream press 
and in the wider community as "leftist" or "radical". In itself this did not necessarily 
mean that the information presented during the process may not have been accurate, but it 
reflects on the perceived legitimacy of the tribunal process. The organizers themselves 
contributed to this location of the tribunal in the context of an international ideological 
conflict. For example, Kali Akuno, during a panel discussion about the International 
Tribunal, depicted the International Tribunal as part of a larger "anti-capitalist, anti-
imperialist" movement: "I would argue a long range movement goal, and that is to make 
the 'world,' anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist, so all of this energy ultimately is just a 
small part of an overall global movement.,,295 The "chief prosecuting attorney" 
Lumbumba also included rhetoric in his closing speeches that expressly located those 
participating in the tribunal on the political left. He referred to those in the audience as 
292 Ibid. 
293 Ibid. 
294 "Press Statement: International tribunal Issues Preliminary Findings," International Tribunal on 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, internationaltribunal.orgltribunal-news/press-statement-international-
tri bunal-issues-preliminary-fi .html. 
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July 2007. 
81 
University of Cape Town
"comrades," spoke of the imperialism of the American court system, and termed societies 
such as Cuba and Venezuela as "revolutionary cultures.".296 Within the local context and 
the cultural climate of the United States, such rhetoric easily detracts from perceived 
legitimacy in the wider community, in that it isolates the speaker on one side of the 
political fence. Participants in the process thus both aided and detracted from the 
legitimacy of the process. Lawyers from prestigious organizations probably aided in the 
legitimacy. However, the fact that the majority of the judges hailed from union and 
workers' parties from all over the world affected the perceived objectivity of the process. 
Funding for the international tribunal came from fundraising efforts of supportive 
organizations in multiple countries and through private donations.297 For example, the 
Brazilian Worker's Party launched a campaign across Brazil to raise funds for the 
tribuna1.298 The funding for the International Commission of Inquiry was the People's 
Hurricane Relief Fund and Oversight Coalition in partnership with the Gulf South Allied 
Funders, "an alliance of progressive donors formed in response to Hurricane Katrina 
including the Resource Generation, Women Donors Network, Threshold Foundation, 
Tides Foundation, and an ever growing number of individual donors.,,299 
The International Tribunal gained significant attention from alternative media 
sources affiliated with the left. Coverage of the international tribunal can be found on 
blogs and websites such as: the website for the International Action Center, an "anti-
imperialist, anti-capitalist organization,,;30o Pambazuka News, "a weekly forum for social 
justice in Africa;" and Revolution.com, the "voice of the Revolutionary Communist 
Party, USA,,301 among others. However, the Tribunal struggled to gain mainstream media 
attention. In one blog, one tribunal supporter claimed that the tribunal was "virtually 
boycotted" by the mainstream media. The tribunal did manage to get endorsements from 
296 Lumumba, Closing Arguments [video recording]. 
297 "Things you can do to help the International Tribunal on Hurricane Katrina," People's Hurricane Relief 
Fund, http://www.peopleshurricane.org/tribunal. 
298 "Brazilian Worker's Party," International Tribunal on Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, 
http://internationaltribunal.orglbrazilians-workers-partyl. 
299 Gulf South Allied Funders, http://www.gsaf.info. 
300 Monica Moorehead, "Eyewitness Reports to Hurricane Katrina Tribunal," International Action Center, 
5 September 2007, http://www .iacenter.orgl archi ve-2007 Inew -orleans0907 .html. 
301 "International Tribunal: Powerful Testimony Documents Bush Crimes Against Humanity," 4 December 
2005, Revolution.com, http://revcom.us/a!025/international-tribunal-katrina.htm. 
82 
University of Cape Town
celebrities in the entertainment world, such as Mos Def and Talib Kwali.3D2 The news 
about the tribunal was spread to hurricane survivors around the country through the 
PHRF network. Volunteers went out into the community, talking with individuals to 
spread the word. In addition, outreach was done on the PHRF website. In the weeks 
heading up to the tribunal, PHRF offices held survivor meetings in several cities across 
the US including New York and Atlanta every two weeks to gather stories of the 
survivors and to keep people informed as to the process. One challenge that was faced in 
letting survivors know about the tribunal is the challenge of locating survivors in the first 
place.3D3 
302 International Tribunal on Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, www.internationaltribunal.org. 
303 Panel Discussion on the International Tribunal on Hurricanes Katrina and Rita [audio recording], US 
Social Forum, 28 July 2007. 
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Conclusion 
As illustrated throughout this thesis, communities in the United States have begun 
to adopt and adapt truth-telling mechanisms to their own contexts. Using such truth 
telling mechanisms in non-transitional, unofficial and community-level contexts breaks 
out of the standard assumptions made in the transitional justice literature about the truth 
commission model as typically functioning as part of a new transitional regime, in an 
official capacity and on a nation-wide scale. This chapter will examine the ways in which 
the structures of the various unofficial truth processes examined in this thesis influenced 
their perceived legitimacy, their ability to generate acknowledgment of victims, and the 
role of the victims in the process itself. Next I will look at the paradigm shifts necessary 
in order to make space for further unofficial truth processes in the context of the United 
States. I will also touch on the ways in which the South African approach to truth telling 
embodied in the TRC influenced truth-telling efforts in the United States. 
4.1 Unofficial Truth Processes: Inclusiveness and Legitimacy 
By examining the Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 
comparison with both Katrina truth-telling initiatives, one can observe important 
differences in the respective objectives and actual achievements of these processes. These 
differences are closely related to the different ways in which the truth processes were 
structured and unfolded. 
One of the most pertinent issues regarding unofficial truth processes is that of 
their perceived legitimacy. Even more than for official truth commissions, as noted at the 
outset in the Introduction, achieving legitimacy is a vital requirement for unofficial truth 
processes. Issues of legitimacy are complicated, in that perceived legitimacy necessarily 
has a subjective dimension varying from person to person, and across different groups or 
social sectors. For example, in the context of Greensboro, the fact that some prominent 
church leaders supported the process contributed to its legitimacy, whereas the Mayor's 
rejection of the process challenged its legitimacy. These contrasting approaches to the 
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GTRC reflected profound historical and social divisions within the Greensboro 
community, and thus represented part of the very problem that the GTRC sought to 
overcome in terms of its objective of community reconciliation. In short, if the GTRC 
only found support from certain sectors of the community, and if it could not extend this 
to the wider community, then it would fail in its stated objectives. Achieving some 
measure of legitimacy in the wider community was a necessary condition for the success 
of the GTRC as an unofficial truth process. It followed that the truth process had to be 
structured as inclusively as possible. 
One can see the measures taken by the GTRC as an attempt to devise as inclusive 
a process as possible. For example, the selection of the commissioners involved a 
complicated process with attempted checks and balances through the establishment of the 
Selection Panel. The Selection Panel included representatives from diverse organizations 
within the wider community. Effectively this was designed to make the process as 
inclusive as possible, even though not all groups chose to participate. (One can see how 
by declining the invitation to participate certain groups could affect the legitimacy of the 
process, just as boycotting a vote may endanger the perceived legitimacy of an election.). 
Still, the GTRC certainly made a determined attempt to establish the legitimacy of the 
truth process by making it inclusive in these ways. 
On the other side of the spectrum, the Katrina truth projects did not make it a 
priority to construct an inclusive process and in consequence achieved little wider 
legitimacy. The SDPC Katrina National Commission rested heavily on the legitimacy and 
respect granted to the Black Church within the African American community, and the 
American public as a whole. In some ways, the SDPC Commission did not want to 
achieve inclusiveness, but rather saw itself as a vessel with which to express the African 
American voice in particular. For its part, the International Tribunal on Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita grounded itself firmly in one political camp, and did not take proactive 
measures to fashion wider coalitions. Even though the messages and stories that were 
brought before the tribunal may have been completely accurate as information, the 
process was manifestly partisan. 
In a sense, if the process is able to achieve its goals, that being community 
reconciliation, by virtue of garnering wide-spread community support even in the face of 
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government opposition, than legitimacy in the "eyes" of the government is not 
necessarily a priority. For example, in Greensboro, although the process may have been 
rejected by those in government, if wide scale community support on both sides of the 
racial divide participated, and the members of the community began to work together to 
engage with each other, bridge gaps and heal cleavages, could one not say that despite the 
political rejection, the project did succeed to an extent? 
In both Katrina truth-telling initiatives, the truth-telling processes were 
instrumental, in that they were conceived to serve as lobbying instruments for actions on 
the part of the government. The process took place with goals in mind. People testified in 
order to gain certain defined political objectives, such as the establishment of a bipartisan 
congressional committee, or the official recognition of Katrina survivors as Internally 
Displaced Persons. Although Akuno of the PHRF stressed that the process' ultimate goal 
was in order for the victims of Hurricane Katrina to be "made whole," this was not to be 
achieved by their participation in the public hearings as such. Instead, Katrina victims 
would be made whole if the government actually listened to the demands and 
recommendations of the project. In other words, testifying did not take place for the sake 
of healing; testifying was instrumental in getting the government to take certain actions, 
which would then contribute to the healing of the community. However, if the goal of the 
process is to mobilize the government into action, as it was in the context of the Katrina 
projects, the failure to establish legitimacy in the eyes of the government is an inherent 
catch-22. 
The SDPC managed to retain some legitimacy in the eyes of government 
representatives, as evidenced by the support of Barack Obama, the inclusion of SDPC 
members at the table in post-Katrina talks with Congressmen, and the willingness on the 
part of FEMA officials, representatives from the Army, as well as Hilary Rodham 
Clinton to testify in the public hearings. 
The International Tribunal managed to garner support from political figures such 
as Cynthia McKinney and labor movements, however relative to the context of the 
current US administration, such a recipe would most likely not enable the project to 
achieve its concrete goals, and would be successful purely in a symbolic sense, with 
mobilization of people standing up for their rights for its own sake. The Katrina Tribunal 
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did carry out an antagonistic process, with an interesting strategy in mind: to put 
international pressure on the US government by exposing gross human rights violations, 
and therefore obliging the government to respect the human rights of survivors in order to 
save face. Such a strategy may have been successful, had the Tribunal waged a more 
inclusive process, reaching out to a wider base of political ideologies around the world, 
including, but not limited to, labor movements and leftist parties. 
This issue can be sharpened by considering the role of "victims" in the public 
hearings of the Katrina truth processes. As we have seen, victims hearings are a notable 
feature of the truth commission model; as truth processes they differ from criminal trials 
in being victim-centered. Although a select few "ordinary" victims were invited to testify 
in the public hearings during the Katrina truth processes, organizational representatives 
and high profile speakers were prioritized. Both the SDPC Katrina Justice Commission 
and the International Tribunal took this approach. Akuno acknowledged this point saying 
that yes, because of time restraints, only representative stories would be chosen-stories 
which would make the best case. This reflected the instrumental nature of the exercise. 
Instead, the testimony-gathering projects which ran parallel to the international tribunal 
could be seen as collecting stories for the sake of voices of victims being listened to, 
valued and recorded. 
The tendency to use the truth process in instrumental ways should be considered 
in light of the present circumstances, in that the victims of the hurricane are still in 
desperate need of relief. Similar dynamics have been described in relation to the 
Zimbabwean truth project, Breaking the Silence: "Yet, the international community, and 
policy makers in particular, need to know what is happening in order to understand the 
urgency of bringing Mugabe and his cohorts to account. Truth telling, therefore, is vital at 
this historical moment.,,304 The truth processes for Katrina were not purely, or even 
primarily, backwards-looking enterprises; instead the truth about Katrina was supposed to 
deal with ongoing issues. As opposed to saying what happen-ed, the commissions dealt 
equally with what was happen-ing. Therefore, contextualized, one can see the logic 
behind the instrumental nature of the commissions. 
304 Eppel, " 'Healing the Dead,'" 261. 
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4.2 Paradigm Shifts: From Official Truth Commissions to Unofficial Community-
based Truth Processes 
Truth commissions have most commonly taken place in the context of a regime 
shift from authoritarianism to a democracy, usually take place on an official level, and 
usually take place with nation-wide scope.305 Most of the literature discussing the value 
or harm for truth processes grounded in restorative justice centers around the truth 
commission institution. The truth processes examined in this paper, however, do not fit 
into the framework, and are not considered "truth commissions", per se. How is the use 
of truth mechanisms as discussed in this paper to reconcile with commonly held 
understandings of when these types of truth mechanisms are necessary? In order to "make 
space" for the role of unofficial truth projects in the discussions surrounding transitional 
justice, two paradigm shifts are necessary: one which stretches our understanding of 
"transitions" and another which makes space for truth processes to take place on both 
levels: nationwide and community level truth processes. 
The "transition" element of transitional justice seems to imply that there is 
something unique about societies shifting from authoritarianism to democracy that entails 
a specific type of justice, hence the term transitional justice. While this is certainly true, 
this "rubric of transitional justice" may not make allowances for other societies who 
could benefit from similar justice principles and processes. Jenniffer Llewellyn argues 
that, "Just as transitional justice scholars have recognized the potential of truth 
commissions as institutions of restorative justice, at the same time they have 
misunderstood and unduly limited the power, scope and implications of this insight for 
the future." She goes on to say, "If the spectacle of transitional justice is removed, one 
can see clearly that restorative justice is not partial justice or a special kind of justice, 
limited to certain circumstances; rather it is a comprehensive theory of justice that has 
much to offer post-peace accord societies in their transitions and beyond.,,306 In other 
words, societies which are stable democracies, but under which human rights abuse still 
takes place, may still benefit from restorative justice measures. 
305 Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 14 
306 Llewellyn, "Restorative Justice in Transitions and Beyond," 90-1. 
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One way of reconciling the issue of understanding how transitional justice 
mechanisms in a "non-transitional society" is by stretching our understanding of what a 
transition entails. One can do this through a wider understanding of transitional society: 
as one in which a society moves from a period of conflict, violence and massive human 
rights abuse to a period of peace. Bickford defines transitional justice in this wider sense 
in his defmition which is included in the Macmillan Encyclopedia of Genocide and 
Crimes Against Humanity, "Transitional justice refers to a range of approaches that 
societies undertake to reckon with legacies of widespread or systematic human rights 
abuse, as they move from a period of violent conflict or oppression towards peace, 
democracy, the rule oflaw, and respect for individual and collective rightS.,,307 
The truth projects examined in this paper also challenged the conventional 
understanding of truth processes as ideally taking place on a national level. An argument 
has been made by Lundy and McGovern in the context of the Arondyne Commemoration 
Project, for the benefits on engaging with people on a community level. Such benefits 
include: more community control over the process that allows the process to be fit to the 
community's specific needs, 308 and an increase of trust in the community members 
towards those carrying out the process.309 Shari Eppel argues for the benefits of 
community level truth processes in that participation by community members may 
increase their participation in democracy on a national level, "It may even be the case that 
involving communities in experiences that empowered them to claim certain rights and 
create "positive peace" at a very local level has increased the likelihood of those 
communities taking part proactively in democratic processes at the nationallevel.,,310 
Eppel also argues that the community-level approach to truth-telling is important in that it 
shifts the society at the roots, where change is most needed, "We reinforce John Paul 
Lederach's idea that peace-building efforts need to engage ordinary people, and not only 
representational leadership, if new relational patterns and structures are to be generated in 
an authentic and sustainable way.,,311 Will Gravely also ~choes this sentiment, "The fact 
that truth and reconciliation efforts are occurring at the grassroots level in the United 
. 307 Louis Bickford, "What is Transitional Justice?" ICTJ, http://www.ictj.org/enitj. 
308 Lundy and McGovern, "Community-based Approaches to Post Conflict Truth-Telling," 38. 
309 Lundy and McGovern, "Community-based Approaches to Post Conflict Truth-Telling," 38,44. 
310 Eppel, "'Healing the Dead' ," 263. 
311 Ibid., 263. 
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States may in some sense be a blessing in disguise ... investment in truth-telling and 
community building may lead to sustainable changes where we live, work, and play.,,312 
The third element of the conventional understanding of transitional justice is the 
official nature of the processes. In the first chapter of this thesis I explored the many 
ways in which unofficial truth projects face challenges. It is possible however, that 
despite those challenges, an unofficial truth process may nevertheless be worth pursuing. 
Complimentary to the community-level focus of a commission, the unofficial status can 
also add to the amount of community autonomy in regards to control of the proj ect. Also, 
unofficial truth commissions have the flexibility of not having to wait for a government 
to initiate the process, the community can do it themselves. As Eppel pointed out in the 
context of Zimbabwe, even though the unofficial truth process may be disadvantaged in 
as far as funding a legal powers go, a truth commission can still find space to "reclaim" 
the historical truth and some amount of social reparation can take place.313 
The idea for holding a truth commission-like process in communities in the 
United States has recently gained some attention from scholars and journalists. To begin 
with, the GTRC posits itself as a potential model for other communities in the United 
States to follow SUit.314 Lisa Magarell, the International Center for Transitional Justice 
consultant for the GTRC, also echoed that sentiment. As is argued in this thesis, she calls 
for the truth project model to be expanded in its scope, "The Greensboro truth 
commission is a vivid illustration of the fact that even established democracies-
particularly the U.S. with its history of slavery and racial segregation, but also Canada, 
Australia, and Spain-must deal with and find ways to resolve the legacies of abuse that 
continue to haunt them today.,,315 STAR was founded in the wake of Desmond Tutu's 
challenge for the United States to take on a similar truth process to face their past of 
racial injustices as South Africa did.316 Grandin and Kublock of the Radical History 
Review discuss truth commission-like processes in the United States, arguing that a 
312 Will Gravely, "Race, Truth and Reconciliation in the United States," Journal of Religion and Society 3 
(2001): 2. 
313 Eppel, " 'Healing the Dead' ," 286. 
314 Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, www.greensborotrc.org. 
315 Susan Grego, "Report from US Truth Commission reveals Police Negligence and Official Deception 
around 1979 Tragedy," International Centrefor Transitional Justice, 26 May 2006, 
http://www .ictj .org/ en/news/press/release/949 .html. 
316 Anthony Taddunni, "What is STAR?" Southern Truth and Reconciliation, www.southerntruth.org. 
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transition has not forced the US to undergo a truth commission process akin to other 
countries, but nevertheless, events have occurred that have warranted inquiry and truth 
commission-like efforts.317 Elizabeth Kiss also stresses the potential for truth projects to 
be beneficial to communities in the United States, as does Stanford Levinson.318 The idea 
to hold a truth commission, or truth commissions, in the United States is not a new one, 
and deserves attention in as far as exploring ways in which communities are already 
making strides towards this goa1.319 
4.3 STAR: South Africa meets the American South 
STAR stands for Southern Truth and Reconciliation. STAR is a non-profit 
organization that consults with communities in the American South in order to develop a 
tailor-made truth process for that individual community to deal with traumatic past 
events, specifically, though not limited to, events that took place in the South which have 
to deal with racial and ethnic injustices. The organization was founded after Desmond 
Tutu completed a year as a visiting professor at Emory University, located in Atlanta, 
Georgia. Tutu had "challenged the United States to address its history of racial violence 
with an effort equivalent to that of the South African process.,,320 A group of scholars and 
professors collaborated together to form this organization that takes on a consultant role 
for communities. 
STAR grounds its work in similar theory to that of the South African TRC. STAR 
operates under the assumption that by examining the past, a community makes strides 
towards reconciliation. "STAR is about helping communities 'dig up the past' but with 
the intention of helping these communities journey through conflict as a means of 
317 Grandin and Kublick, "Introduction: A US Truth Commission?" Radical History Review 97 (2007): 99-
101. 
318 Kiss, "Moral Ambition Within and Beyond Political Restraints," 92; Levinson, "Trials, Commissions, 
and Investigating Committees," 214. 
319 For information surrounding an official truth-commission on a community level in the United States, 
see, Alfred L. Brophy, "The Tulsa Race Riot Commission, Apology, and Reparation: Understanding the 
Functions and Limitations of a Historical Truth Commission," in Taking Wrongs Seriously: Apologies and 
Reconciliation, ed. Elazar Barkan and Alexander Karn (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006): 
234-258. 
320 Taddunni,"What is Star?" 1. 
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becoming more inclusive, whole and functional.,,321 They identify their efforts as part of 
the realm of restorative, as opposed to retributive,justice.322 
The organization stresses the uniqueness of each community, with emphasis on 
the fact that each community may, and should, approach truth and reconciliation in 
different ways, specific to their particular context. They therefore offer a "menu of 
options-a list of programs and events that promote truth-telling and community 
building," in order that the community can choose which would best suit their particular 
dynamic and needs.323 
Thus far, STAR has consulted with four different communities on truth and 
reconciliation projects. One such project was in regards to the Atlanta Race Riot of 1906. 
The project entailed building a museum exhibition surrounding the event, as well as 
scheduling a number of events with local organizations and universities to commemorate 
the event in 2006, a hundred years after the incident. The events and exhibition were 
meant to create a space for "truth, justice, honest conversation and community 
building.,,324 Another project included working with the community of Walton, GA, a 
county where a white mob murdered two black couples in broad daylight in 1946. It is 
believed that some members of the mob are still alive today and live with impunity. An 
organization was established called the Moore's Family Memorial Committee (MFMC). 
The MFMC has been working in partnership with STAR to develop ways in which the 
community (encompassing Walton and surrounding counties) can carry out its own truth 
and reconciliation process. They developed events such as a "diversity" themed carnival 
and public forum conversations to address the issue of race in their county's history. 
These events are planned in order to create an environment which fosters public truth-
telling.325 
Once again, after examining STAR, one can see the growing sphere of influence 
South African approaches to truth and reconciliation have taken in the American South. It 
is a growing trend to adopt the approaches and methods that have been taking place on a 
321 Taddunni, "What is StarT' 2. 
322 Taddunni, "What is StarT' 2. 
323 Taddunni, "What is StarT' 4. 
324 "Issues ofInterest: Atlanta Race Riot 1906", Southern Truth and Reconciliation, 
http://www.southemtruth.org/cases.htm 
325 Tadduni, "What is START' 4. 
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global scale in the context of transitional justice and adopting those methods to smaller 
communities on an unofficial level. 
The strong influence of the South African TRC and Desmond Tutu's approach to 
restorative justice can be visibly seen in both the establishment of STAR as well as the 
Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In the context of the Greensboro 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the link is overt. Even in the mandate of the 
GTRC, the South African TRC is directly quoted. "We affirm the South African Truth 
and Reconciliation motto: 'Without Truth, no Healing; without Forgiveness, no Future'." 
In addition, other links can be seen throughout the entire GTRC process. For example, 
Desmond Tutu came twice to meet with those working on the GTRC project.326 He 
drafted a letter of support, which the GTRC displays proudly on their website. In 
addition, a South African minister, Reverend Bongani Finca, a commissioner for the 
South African TRC, also presided over the opening public hearings for the GTRC.327 The 
weekly newsletter for the GTRC was entitled, "Ubuntu Weekly," borrowing the South 
African term "Ubuntu," a term meaning community, or 'a person is a person through 
persons'. In addition, another South African minister, Dr. Peter Storey was a member of 
.the National Advisory Board, once more solidifying the link between South Africa and 
the GTRC. Finally, the Greensboro Truth and Community Reconciliation Project took a 
trip to South Africa in 2007 in order to learn from South Africans who have gone through 
a TRC as a nation.328 In the processes surrounding Hurricane Katrina, an overt link is not 
made to the South African TRC. 
It is apparent that the influence of the South African TRC on a global scale has 
influenced and inspired the truth-seeking efforts that have taken place in the Southern 
United States to a large extent. Truth-seeking efforts in the United States can be located 
as part of the extension of influence of the use of truth commission-like processes to 
work through violent, human rights abusive pasts, with the holding a truth commission 
like truth process as a viable and tried option. 
326 Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report, Annex, Timeline, 202. 
327 Susan Grego, "Greensboro Truth Commission to Hold Public Hearing July 15-6," International Center 
for Transitional Justice, www.ictj.org. 
328 Greensboro Truth and Community Reconciliation Project, www.gtrcp.org. 
93 
University of Cape Town
Bibliography 
Printed Sources 
Bennanzohn, Sally. Through Survivors' Eyes: From the Sixties to the Greensboro Massacre. 
Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2003. 
Bennanzohn, Sally Avery. "A Massacre Survivor Reflects on the Greensboro Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission." Radical History Review 97 (2007): 102-109. 
Bhargava, Rajeev. "Restoring Decency to Barbaric Societies." In Truth v. Justice: the Morality of 
Truth Commissions, edited by Robert Rotberg and Dennis Thompson, 45-67. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2000. 
Bickford, Louis. "Unofficial Truth Projects." Human Rights Quarterly 29, no. 4 (2007): 994-
1035. 
Borer, Tristan Anne. "Truth Telling as a Peace-Building Activity." In Telling the Truths: Truth 
Telling and Peace Building in Post Conflict Societies, edited by Tristan Anne Borer, 1-
58. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 2006. 
Butterbaugh, Laura. "Why did Hurricane Katrina Hit Women So Hard?" Off Our Backs 35 
(2005). 
Brophy, Alfred L. "The Tulsa Race Riot Commission, Apology, and Reparation: Understanding 
the Functions and Limitations of a Historical Truth Commission." In Taking Wrongs 
Seriously: Apologies and Reconciliation, edited by Elazar Barkan and Alexander Kam, 
234-258. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006. 
Du Toit, Andre. "The Moral Foundations ofthe South African TRC." In Truth v. Justice: the 
Morality of Truth Commissions, ed. Robert Rotberg and Dennis Thompson, 122-140. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. 
Dyson, Michael Eric. Come Hell or High Water: Hurricane Katrina and the Color of Disaster. 
New York: Basic Civitas Books, 2006. 
Eppel, Shari. " 'Healing the Dead': Exhumation and Reburial as Truth-Telling and Peace-
Building Activities in Rural Zimbabwe." In Telling the Truths: Truth Telling and Peace 
Building in Post Conflict Societies, edited by Tristan Anne Borer, 259-288. Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame, 2006. 
Freeman, Mark, and Priscilla Hayner. "Truth-Telling." In The International Center for 
Transitional Justice Handbookfor Reconciliation, edited by Mark Freeman and Priscilla 
Hayner, 122-143.2003. 
Grandin, Greg and Thomas Miller Kublick. "Introduction: A US Truth Commission?" Radical 
History Review 97 (2007): 99-101. 
94 
University of Cape Town
Gravely, Will. "Race, Truth and Reconciliation in the United States." Journal of Religion and 
Society 3 (2001): 1-21. 
Hayner, Priscilla. Unspeakable Truths: Corifronting State Terror and Atrocity. New York: 
Routledge, 2001. 
Hayes, Graham. "We Suffer Our Memories: Thinking about the Past, Healing, and 
Reconciliation." American Imago 55 (1998): 29-50. 
Kiss, Elizabeth. "Moral Ambition Within and Beyond Political Restraints." In Truth v. Justice: 
the Morality of Truth Commissions, edited by Robert Rotberg and Dennis Thompson, 68-
98. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000. 
Kritz, Niel. Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes: 
Country Studies. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995. 
Levinson, Sanford. "Trials, Commissions, and Investigating Committees." In Truth v. Justice: the 
Morality of Truth Commissions, edited by Robert Rotberg and Dennis Thompson, 211-
234. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000. 
Llewellyn, Jeniffer. "Restorative Justice in Transitions and beyond: The Justice Potential of 
Truth-Telling Mechanisms for Post-Peace Accord Societies." In Telling the Truths: Truth 
Telling and Peace BUilding in Post Coriflict Societies, edited by Tristan Anne Borer. 
Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 2006. 
Lundy, Patricia, and Mark McGovern. "Community Based Approaches to Post Conflict 'Truth-
telling': Strengths and Limitations." Shared Space 1 (2005): 35-52. 
http://www.community-relations.org.uklfilestore/documents/shared-space-issue-l-d-
lundy-mcgovern.pdf. 
Mendez, Juan E. "The Human Right to Truth: Lessons Learned from Latin American Experiences 
with Truth Telling." In Telling the Truths: Truth Telling and Peace Building in Post 
Conflict Societies, edited by Tristan Anne Borer, 115-150. Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame, 2006. 
Merry, Sally Engle. "Legal Pluralism and Transnational Culture: the Ka Ho' okolokolonui Kanaka 
Maoli Tribunal, Hawaii, 1993." In Human Rights, Culture & Context: Anthropological 
Perspectives, edited by Richard A. Wilson, 28-48. London: Pluto Press, 1997. 
Minow, Martha. "The Hope for Healing: What Can Truth Commissions Do?" In Truth v. Justice: 
the Morality of Truth Commissions, edited by Robert Rotberg and Dennis Thompson, 
235-260. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000. 
O'Donnell, Guillermo, Phillip Schmitter and Lawrence Whitehead, ed. Transitionsfrom 
Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1986. 
O'Donnell, Guillermo, Phillip Schmitter and Lawrence Whitehead, ed. Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule: Latin America. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1986. 
95 
University of Cape Town
Phelps, Theresa Godwin. Shattered Voices: Language, Violence and the Work of Truth 
Commissions. Philadelphia, PN: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004. 
Robertson, Geoffery. Crimes against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice. New York: the 
New Press, 1999. 
Rotberg, Robert and Henry Steiner, ed. Truth Commissions: A Comparative Assessment: An 
Interdisciplinary Discussion Held at Harvard Law School in May 1996. Cambridge: 
Harvard Law School Human Rights Program, 1997. 
Slye, Ronald. "Amnesty, Truth, and Reconciliation: Reflections on the South African Amnesty 
Process." In Truth v. Justice: the Morality of Truth Commissions, edited by Robert 
Rotberg and Dennis Thompson, 170-188. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2000. 
Tutu, Desmond. No Future without Forgiveness. New York: Random House, 1999. 
Weschler, Lawrence. A Miracle, A Universe. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998. 
Wheaton, Elizabeth. Codename Greenkil: The 1979 Greensboro Killings. Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 1986. 
Government Reports 
Department of Homeland Security. The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons 
Learned, by Frances Fragos Townsend. Washington DC: 2006. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/reportslkatrina-Iessons-Iearned.pdf. 
Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane 
Katrina. A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to 
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina. Report 109-377, 
109th Congress, 2nd Session, by Tom Davis. Washington DC: US Government Printing 
Office, 2006. http://www . gpoaccess. gov / serialsetl creportslkatrina.html. 
Special Report of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, US Senate. 
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared. S. Report 109-322, 109th Congress, 2nd 
Session, by Susan Collins. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2006. 
http://www . gpoaccess. gov / serialsetl creports/katrinanation.html. 
Electronic Sources 
ACLU, National Prison Project, Abandoned and Abused: Orleans Parish Prison in the Aftermath 
of Hurricane Katrina, www.ac1u.orglprisonlconditions/26198res20060809.html. 
Beloved Community Center, www.belovedcommunitycenter.org. 
96 
University of Cape Town
Bermanzohn, Paul and Marty Nathan, "Justice and the Greensboro Massacre," Greensboro 
Justice Fund. http://www.gjf.orglindex.php?page==histbro. 
Caruthers, Iva and Bernice Powell Jackson, eds. Katrina National Justice Commission, The 
Breach: Bearing Witness, Samuel DeWitt Proctor Conference, Inc., 4 June 2007. 
www.sdpconference.info 
"Critical Resistance Fact Sheet What We Know: The Status of Prisoners and Policing Post 
Katrina," Critical Resistance, 11 November 2005, 
www.criticalresistance.orglkatrinalpostkatrinastatus.html. 
Greensboro Truth and Community Reconciliation Project, www.gtcrp.org. 
Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, www.greensborotrc.org. 
Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission Blog: A Space for Open Community Dialogue 
about the Work of the CommisSion, http://gtrc.blogspot.com/. 
Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report (2005), www.greensborotrc.org. 
Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Mandate for the Greensboro Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, www.greensborotrc.org. 
Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Selection Process. www.greensborotrc.org. 
"Greensboro, North Carolina," Wikipedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.orglwiki/Greensboro,_North_Carolina. 
"Greensboro to Re-Examine 1979 KKK-Related Deaths" [audiorecording], All Things 
Considered, National Public Radio, 13 June 2004, 
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=1956883. 
Grego, Susan. "Greensboro Truth Commission to Hold Public Hearing July 15-6." International 
Center for Transitional Justice, www.ictj.org. 
Gulf South Allied Funders, http://www.gsaf.info. 
"HR 4197 [109th]: Hurricane Katrina Recovery, Reclamation, Restoration, Reconstruction and 
Reunion Act of 2005", GovTrack.us, www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bil1==hl09-
4197. 
"Hurricane Katrina," Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hurricane Katrina. 
International Tribunal on Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, www.intemationaltribunal.org. 
"Jim Crow Laws," Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikiIJim Crow laws. 
"Klu Klux Klan," Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.orglwiki/Ku_Klux_Klan. 
"Reconciliation in Greensboro" [audiorecording], PBS Religion & Ethics, Episode 810, 5 Nov 
2004, www.pbs.orglwnetlreligionandethics/week810/cover.html. 
97 
University of Cape Town
Bermanzohn, Paul and Marty Nathan, "Justice and the Greensboro Massacre," Greensboro 
Justice Fund. http://www.gjf.orgiindex.php?page=histbro. 
Caruthers, Iva and Bernice Powell Jackson, eds. Katrina National Justice Commission, The 
Breach: Bearing Witness, Samuel DeWitt Proctor Conference, Inc., 4 June 2007. 
www.sdpconference.info 
"Critical Resistance Fact Sheet What We Know: The Status of Prisoners and Policing Post 
Katrina," Critical Resistance, 11 November 2005, 
www.criticalresistance.orgikatrinalpostkatrinastatus.html. 
Greensboro Truth and Community Reconciliation Project, www.gtcrp.org. 
Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, www.greensborotrc.org. 
Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission Blog: A Spacefor Open Community Dialogue 
about the Work of the Commission, http://gtrc.blogspot.com!. 
Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report (2005), www.greensborotrc.org. 
Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Mandate for the Greensboro Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, www.greensborotrc.org. 
Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Selection Process. www.greensborotrc.org. 
"Greensboro, North Carolina," Wikipedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.orgiwiki/Greensboro,_North_Carolina. 
"Greensboro to Re-Examine 1979 KKK-Related Deaths" [audiorecording], All Things 
Considered, National Public Radio, 13 June 2004, 
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1956883. 
Grego, Susan. "Greensboro Truth Commission to Hold Public Hearing July 15-6." International 
Center for Transitional Justice, www.ictj.org. 
Gulf South Allied Funders, http://www.gsaf.info. 
"HR 4197 [l09th]: Hurricane Katrina Recovery, Reclamation, Restoration, Reconstruction and 
Reunion Act of 2005", GovTrack.us, www.govtrack.us/congresslbill.xpd?bi11=h109-
4197. 
"Hurricane Katrina," Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hurricane Katrina. 
International Tribunal on Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, www.internationaltribunal.org. 
"Jim Crow Laws," Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jim Crow laws. 
"KIu Klux Klan," Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.orgiwiki/Ku_Klux_Klan. 
"Reconciliation in Greensboro" [audiorecording], PBS Religion & Ethics, Episode 810, 5 Nov 
2004, www.pbs.orgiwnetlreligionandethics/week81 01 cover .html. 
97 
